Examining Security Culture On A Case-by-Case Basis: Pelindaba Research Facility, 2007

By Gray Macfie

Security Leadership Fellow, CITS

By all accounts, the Pelindaba Research Facility in South Africa is a well-guarded facility, boasting security measures that make it one of the more insulated HEU research reactors in the nuclear industry.[1] Despite such protective measures, on the night of November 7^th 2007, a team of four attackers was able to infiltrate the facility and remain inside for 45 minutes, shooting emergency services officer Anton Gerber in the chest before ultimately leaving. As this four-man team was operating inside the facility, a second team fired upon retreating security forces from outside the perimeter.[2] Although no nuclear material was taken, the assault offers a unique opportunity to study CBRN security culture. The break-in at the Pelindaba facility was made possible not by a failure of physical measures, but instead by a lack of proper routines and practices.

The attack began with a team breaching the fence, picking a spot located in a ravine so as to be out of sight of guards. One man used plastic clips to raise the fence and crawl underneath. Once inside he shut off power to the fence so that the rest of the men could enter. While this relatively well-coordinated security breach took place out of direct sight from guards and the road, the entire 20-minute procedure was caught on camera. However, no guards sounded an alarm, raising a concern from some that the attackers had inside help. [3] Simple routine procedures could have alerted security personnel to the assault. Had the cameras been properly monitored and the break-in reported, it is very likely that they assault on the facility could have been drastically mitigated.

Undetected, the team walked ¾ of a mile inside the perimeter, where they ultimately made it to the emergency control center. Emergency services officer Anton Gerber sounded the alarm after sustaining a gunshot wound to the chest. Gerber estimates that it should have taken approximately three minutes for backup to arrive from the nearby security office. Instead it took security forces 24 minutes to respond. The team ultimately fled, but not before beating Gerber with a metal rod.2

As is often the case, inadequate security culture can be traced back to before the incident took place. In the months leading up to the incident, the South African Department of Energy and Minerals reported a lack of adequate security measures at the facility. A 2006-2007 report shows 0% completion of prescribed design basis threat.[4] In a sense, DBTs are the paradigm of proper security culture. A properly implemented design basis threat would likely have proved invaluable to the security culture of the facility. It would have helped foster a preparedness that was lacking at the time of the assault. 

The 2007 attack on the Pelindaba research facility was characterized by an inadequate and delayed response from security forces. As is the case with many security breaches, the human factor remains at the core of the break-in. The Pelindaba attack stands as a reminder to those working in the field of CBRN security that protective measures come not only in the form of alarms and fences, but in a pervading security culture of readiness and competence.

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[1] Bunn, Matthew. Securing the Bomb 2008. Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, November 2008.

[2] Zenko, Micah. “A Nuclear Site is Breached.” Washington Post. December 20, 2007.

[3] CBS News. “Nuke Facility Raid An Inside Job?” 60 Minutes. June 21, 2010

[4] Department of Minerals and Energy (South Africa). “Annual Report 2006/07,” 2007

President Obama Speaks at the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Sy...

International Conference on Chemical Safety and Security

CITS Director William W. Keller moderated a panel and spoke at the international conference on chemical safety and security, organized and sponsored by the EU, Government of Poland, OPCW, and the city of Tarnow. The overall objectives of the conference included, among many other:

• Promote a global chemical safety and security culture and international cooperation in the field
• Share a commitment for actions to strengthen the global chemical safety and security culture

The government of Poland has recently announced the establishment, with the assistance of the OPCW, of the International Center for Chemical Safety and Security, whose role it is to promote best practices in chemical safety and security globally and provide assistance to all interested parties.  Please visit the OPCW live feed from the conference, or read more information about the conference.

CITS in Indonesia

During the week of October 15, 2012, CITS researchers conducted four briefings for officials of Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) and three research reactor facilities in Serpong, Bandung and Yogyakarta. The purpose of the briefings was to introduce the recently-developed methodology to assess nuclear security culture. Self-assessments will be performed by BATAN's specially-designated teams, with the preliminary results presented in a report in mid-2013. The methodology has been developed by a group of international experts, including CITS, under the IAEA auspices, and will be recommended, after review, to all member states possibly as early as 2013. For more information, contact Dr. Igor Khripunov.

Proposed US Legislation Will Turn Nuclear Security Over to Military

An Ohio congressman has introduced legislation that would put the military in charge of security at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge and other U.S. facilities where nuclear weapons parts and critical weapons-making materials are housed.

U.S. Rep. Michael Turner, R-Ohio, cited the recent security failures at Y-12 — including the July 28 intrusion by an 82-year-old nun and two other protesters — as evidence that the current system is broken and needs fixing.

Under the bill, which has six co-sponsors, the Pentagon would be responsible for security of nuclear weapons and the special nuclear materials, such as highly enriched uranium, that are used to make them. The Defense Department also would be responsible for securing the transportation of weapons and special nuclear materials.

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Nuclear Terrorism Treaties Still Incomplete

by Andy Semmel

September 14th, 2012

Andy Semmel served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for nuclear nonproliferation in the George W. Bush administration. He is on the board of directors of Partnership for a Secure America.

Congress hasn’t given its best effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Despite broad bipartisan recognition that nuclear terror is one of the biggest threats of our time, two common-sense anti-terrorism treaties have been on the “to-do” list for more than half a decade. The Senate has the opportunity to pass those treaties in the weeks ahead and should do so for one simple reason: They would make America more secure. There is a long and commendable record of U.S. bipartisan support for policies and practices that prevent nuclear terrorism and impede nuclear proliferation. Successive administrations and both political parties have broadly agreed that combating nuclear terrorism ranks at the top of our foreign policy and national security agenda. The 9/11 Commission warned, “The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates noted, “Every senior leader, when you’re asked what keeps you awake at night, it’s the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”

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Better Radiological Security at U.S. Medical Facilities Needed

Additional Actions Needed to Improve Security of Radiological Sources at U.S. Medical Facilities argues the most recent report from the Government Accountability Office.

Strengthening Nuclear Security Education and Training

"You may have the best legislation and regulations and state-of- the- art equipment, but unless you have a sufficient number of well-educated and trained staff, you will not necessarily have an effective and sustainable nuclear security infrastructure and nuclear security culture. Therefore, a national nuclear security regime stands or falls because of the quality of people involved". Dr. Khammar Mrabit, Director, IAEA Office of Nuclear Security. Read more...

III INSEN Annual Meeting

The International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) is holding its third annual meeting in Vienna, Austria, July 9-13, 2012. 

Participants in the 2012 Annual INSEN Meeting

INSEN Background

The need for human resource development programs in nuclear security was underlined at several IAEA General Conferences and Board of Governors’ Meetings. More recently, human resource development was highlighted by the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits, which identified it as key to improving nuclear security culture and contributing to better protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Successive IAEA Nuclear Security Plans, the most recent of which was approved by the Board of Governors in September 2009 give high priority to assisting States in establishing educational programs in nuclear security in order to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security improvements. The current IAEA Nuclear Security Plan covering2010-2013 emphasizes the importance of considering existing capacities at international, regional and national levels while designing nuclear security academic programs.

In the course of implementing the Plans, the IAEA developed — together with academics and nuclear security experts from Member States — a guide entitled Educational Programme in Nuclear Security that consists of a model of a Master of Science (M.Sc.) and a Certificate Programme in Nuclear Security. This guide was published as IAEA Nuclear SecuritySeries No. 12 – Educational Programme in Nuclear Security in April 2010 to assist universities or other educational institutes in developing academic programs in nuclear security.

In order to better address current and future requests for assistance in this area, the IAEA organized a workshop in March 2010 during which the participants agreed to facilitate the collaboration among universities, research institutes and other stakeholders and established the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), a collaboration network for higher education in nuclear security.

INSEN members (currently 61 from over 20 countries) participate in three working groups to develop educational materials, create opportunities for faculty and student professional development, and promote INSEN and nuclear security education throughout the community. All members participate on a voluntary basis. To obtain more information, please contact the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security at nusec@iaea.org.

CBRN Security Culture Seminar in Indonesia

In May 2012, CITS held a two-day seminar entitled “Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear Security: Factoring In the Human Element”. The seminar was co-organized and hosted by the National Nuclear Energy Agency of Indonesia (BATAN) in Jakarta, Indonesia. The seminar included a one-day session on nuclear and radiological security culture for a group of BATAN security officers, which previously attended a regional training course offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 2011 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The session helped build upon the information provided at the IAEA course, and offered an in-depth analysis, evaluation, and tools for improvement of security culture at Indonesia’s nuclear and radiological facilities. The second-day session, designed for government officials dealing with CBRN security, helped improve, pursuant to requirements of the UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1540, the security of CBRN materials by building the capacity of facility personnel to follow proactively security procedures and practices, and reduce the risk of these materials being diverted for malicious purposes. The second-day session utilized the findings of the international workshop “In Search of Sustainable CBRN Security Culture” organized and held by CITS in partnership with the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs in Athens, GA (USA) in February 2012. The seminar was attended by about 50 representatives of various government agencies dealing with CBRN security issues, including BATAN, the National Nuclear Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN), CBRN Unit of the Indonesian Army, National Police, Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence Agency, and National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). This event was made possible through generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Nuclear Security: the EU Take

The final report of the Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security, established in 2011 to assess the security of nuclear facilities in the EU, can be found here. The report was published May 31, 2012.

Promoting Nuclear Security Culture in the Developing World

04/05/2012 - Trieste

Nuclear and radioactive materials, though useful and beneficial in many fields including energy, medicine, agriculture and industry, could pose a danger to the environment and to the public if handled improperly.

To help developing countries build effective nuclear security strategies, the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) and its partner, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will conduct the second annual "International School on Nuclear Security" in Trieste from 7 to 18 May 2012.

The School, which combines ICTP's international network of researchers in developing countries with IAEA nuclear security expertise, plays an essential role in supporting countries' efforts to prepare experts who are well equipped and qualified to analyse national nuclear security needs, prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or the use of nuclear and radioactive material for criminal or unauthorized acts, and prepare effective response measures to nuclear security events.

Co-sponsored by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the School was initially proposed by the Italian government in 2010 during a Nuclear Summit in Washington, DC, where a number of nations pledged their support to strengthen global nuclear security. The School was reinforced during the Nuclear Security Summit this year in March in Seoul, where the Italian government announced to support this important initiative also in the future. Italy, ICTP's chief sponsor, included the Trieste school amongst its nuclear security action plans.

Facts about the School:

• 208 applications
• 57 participants from 39 countries
• 23% women
• Participants come from regulatory authorities, universities, research institutes, different national ministries, and law enforcement agencies

More details about the School are available on its website.

Related link: IAEA and Nuclear Security

New Book from CITS -- Legal Framework for Strengthening Nuclear Security and Combating Nuclear Terrorism

The first decade of the 21st century has seen the development of new international approaches to strengthening nuclear security and combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. These approaches include the adoption of new and revised international legal instruments that mandate countries to take certain measures in this critical area. In parallel, a number of initiatives have proceeded on the basis of non-binding principles and other voluntary mechanisms to address nuclear terrorism. Notwithstanding the recent enhancement of international legal approaches to addressing the threat to nuclear security, substantive and procedural arrangements must be significantly strengthened.

For two days, on January 28 and 29, 2010, over 100 international experts from more than 20 countries and international organizations discussed ways to deal with this range of critical issues. Organized by the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security (CITS), Dean Rusk Center for International Law, and School of Public and International Affairs, in partnership with the Russian Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and sponsored by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program, Nuclear Threat Initiative, World Institute for Nuclear Security, University of Salzburg, Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, American Bar Association, and other partners, the Advanced Research Workshop—“Legal Framework for Strengthening Nuclear Security and Combating Nuclear Terrorism”—was held in Vienna, Austria. This volume reflects the presentations and deliberations of workshop participants in an attempt to summarize the current understanding of, and approaches to, the legal framework for nuclear security and counterterrorism. It is the authors’ hope that the materials from this volume will be useful for governments, international organizations, researchers, and practitioners worldwide in their efforts to secure nuclear materials and prevent nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear And Radiological Security Culture: A Post-Seoul Summit Agenda

This report is based upon the proceedings of the workshop “In Search of Sustainable CBRN Security Culture” organized by the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia (CITS/UGA). This three day event, held in Athens, GA, on February 6‐8, 2012, was made possible by generous support from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the Stanley Foundation, and the UGA School of Public and International Affairs.

As the first of two reports resulting from the workshop, this report’s scope is limited to nuclear and radiological security culture. The rationale for its early release in March 2012 was to deliver the report in time for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. The second, more comprehensive report covering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear areas will draw on some of the findings of the first report, and will be published later in 2012.

Both reports reflect the workshop objective of synthesizing the expertise accumulated by governments, industries, and academia into comprehensive and universally applicable best practice tools and models that would be based on shared principles and approaches in these four areas. Building a common architecture will enable countries that are lacking expertise in these fields to optimize the role of the human factor in dealing with risks and complying with their international obligations, including those under UNSCR 1540 (for more information about the workshop, see the Annex to the report).

Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Statement

We, the leaders, gathered in Seoul on March 26-27, 2012, renew the political commitments generated from the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit to work toward strengthening nuclear security, reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, and preventing terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials. Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security. Defeating this threat requires strong national measures and international cooperation given its potential global political, economic, social, and psychological consequences.

We reaffirm our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Committed to seeking a safer world for all, we also all share the objective of nuclear security. We recognize that the Nuclear Security Summit is a valuable process at the highest political level, supporting our joint call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. In this regard, we welcome the substantive progress being made on the political commitments of Participating States since the Washington Summit.

We stress the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective national and international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control, and to prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials and from obtaining information or technology required to use them for malicious purposes. We likewise recognize the fundamental responsibility of States to maintain effective security of other radioactive materials.

We reaffirm that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Noting the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in facilitating international cooperation and supporting the efforts of States to fulfill their nuclear security responsibilities, we further stress the importance of regional and international cooperation, and encourage States to promote cooperation with and outreach activities to international partners.

Noting the Fukushima accident of March 2011 and the nexus between nuclear security and nuclear safety, we consider that sustained efforts are required to address the issues of nuclear safety and nuclear security in a coherent manner that will help ensure the safe and secure peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We will continue to use the Washington Communiqué and Work Plan as a basis for our future work in advancing our nuclear security objectives. At this Seoul Summit, we agree that we will make every possible effort to achieve further progress in the following important areas.

Global Nuclear Security Architecture

1. We recognize the importance of multilateral instruments that address nuclear security, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). We therefore encourage the universal adherence to these Conventions. We urge states in a position to do so to accelerate their domestic approval of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, seeking to bring the Amendment into force by 2014. We acknowledge the important role of the United Nations (UN) in promoting nuclear security, support the UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1977 in strengthening global nuclear security, and welcome the extension of its mandate. We will strive to use the IAEA Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) document and related Nuclear Security Series documents, and reflect them into national practice.

2. We recognize the contributions since the 2010 Summit of international initiatives and processes such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, within their respective mandates and memberships. We welcome the wider participation in the GICNT and the Global Partnership and value its extension beyond 2012. Noting the importance of strengthening coordination and complementarity among nuclear security activities, we welcome the proposal of the IAEA to organize an international conference in 2013. We welcome contributions from the industry, academia, institutes and civil society that promote nuclear security.

Role of the IAEA

3. We reaffirm the essential responsibility and central role of the IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security framework, and recognize the value of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013. We will work to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to support the implementation of nuclear security objectives. To this end, we encourage States in a position to do so and the nuclear industry to increase voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, as well as in-kind contributions. We also encourage continued IAEA activities to assist, upon request, national efforts to establish and enhance nuclear security infrastructure through its various support programs, and encourage States to make use of these IAEA resources.

Nuclear Materials

4. Recognizing that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium require special precautions, we reemphasize the importance of appropriately securing, accounting for and consolidating these materials. We also encourage States to consider the safe, secure and timely removal and disposition of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them, as appropriate, and consistent with national security considerations and development objectives.

5. We recognize that the development, within the framework of the IAEA, of options for national policies on HEU management will advance nuclear security objectives. We encourage States to take measures to minimize the use of HEU, including through the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, where technically and economically feasible, taking into account the need for assured supplies of medical isotopes, and encourage States in a position to do so, by the end of 2013, to announce voluntary specific actions intended to minimize the use of HEU. We also encourage States to promote the use of LEU fuels and targets in commercial applications such as isotope production, and in this regard, welcome relevant international cooperation on high-density LEU fuel to support the conversion of research and test reactors.

Radioactive Sources

6. Taking into account that radioactive sources are widely used and can be vulnerable to malicious acts, we urge States to secure these materials, while bearing in mind their uses in industrial, medical, agricultural and research applications. To this end, we encourage States in a position to do so to continue to work towards the process of ratifying or acceding to the ICSANT; reflect into national practices relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents, the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary document on the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources; and establish national registers of high- activity radioactive sources where required. We also commit to work closely with the IAEA to encourage cooperation on advanced technologies and systems, share best practices on the management of radioactive sources, and provide technical assistance to States upon their request. In addition, we encourage continued national efforts and international cooperation to recover lost, missing or stolen sources and to maintain control over disused sources.

Nuclear Security and Safety

7. Acknowledging that safety measures and security measures have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and the environment, we affirm that nuclear security and nuclear safety measures should be designed, implemented and managed in nuclear facilities in a coherent and synergistic manner. We also affirm the need to maintain effective emergency preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities in a manner that addresses both nuclear security and nuclear safety. In this regard, we welcome the efforts of the IAEA to organize meetings to provide relevant recommendations on the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety so that neither security nor safety is compromised. We also welcome the convening of the High Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security initiated by the UN Secretary-General, held in New York on 22 September 2011. Noting that the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials also includes spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, we encourage States to consider establishing appropriate plans for the management of these materials.

Transportation Security

8. We will continue efforts to enhance the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials while in domestic and international transport, and encourage States to share best practices and cooperate in acquiring the necessary technologies to this end. Recognizing the importance of a national layered defense against the loss or theft of nuclear and other radioactive materials, we encourage the establishment of effective national nuclear material inventory management and domestic tracking mechanisms, where required, that enable States to take appropriate measures to recover lost and stolen materials.

Combating Illicit Trafficking

9. We underscore the need to develop national capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to and prosecute illicit nuclear trafficking. In this regard, we encourage action-oriented coordination among national capacities to combat illicit trafficking, consistent with national laws and regulations. We will work to enhance technical capabilities in the field of national inspection and detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials at the borders. Noting that several countries have passed export control laws to regulate nuclear transfers, we encourage further utilization of legal, intelligence and financial tools to effectively prosecute offenses, as appropriate and consistent with national laws. In addition, we encourage States to participate in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database program and to provide necessary information relating to nuclear and other radioactive materials outside of regulatory control. We will work to strengthen cooperation among States and encourage them to share information, consistent with national regulations, on individuals involved in trafficking offenses of nuclear and other radioactive materials, including through INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and the World Customs Organization.

Nuclear Forensics

10. We recognize that nuclear forensics can be an effective tool in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses. In this regard, we encourage States to work with one another, as well as with the IAEA, to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities. In this regard, they may combine the skills of both traditional and nuclear forensics through the development of a common set of definitions and standards, undertake research and share information and best practices, as appropriate. We also underscore the importance of international cooperation both in technology and human resource development to advance nuclear forensics.

Nuclear Security Culture

11. Recognizing that investment in human capacity building is fundamental to promoting and sustaining a strong nuclear security culture, we encourage States to share best practices and build national capabilities, including through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. At the national level, we encourage all stakeholders, including the government, regulatory bodies, industry, academia, nongovernmental organizations and the media, to fully commit to enhancing security culture and to maintain robust communication and coordination of activities. We also encourage States to promote human resource development through education and training. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of Centers of Excellence and other nuclear security training and support centers since the Washington Summit, and encourage the establishment of new centers. Furthermore, we welcome the effort by the IAEA to promote networking among such centers to share experience and lessons learned and to optimize available resources. We also note the holding of the Nuclear Industry Summit and the Nuclear Security Symposium on the eve of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

Information Security

12. We recognize the importance of preventing non-state actors from obtaining information, technology or expertise required to acquire or use nuclear materials for malicious purposes, or to disrupt information technology based control systems at nuclear facilities. We therefore encourage States to: continue to develop and strengthen national and facility-level measures for the effective management of such information, including information on the procedures and protocols to protect nuclear materials and facilities; to support relevant capacity building projects; and to enhance cyber security measures concerning nuclear facilities, consistent with the IAEA General Conference Resolution on Nuclear Security(GC(55)/Res/10) and bearing in mind the International Telecommunication Union Resolution 174. We also encourage States to: promote a security culture that emphasizes the need to protect nuclear security related information; engage with scientific, industrial and academic communities in the pursuit of common solutions; and support the IAEA in producing and disseminating improved guidance on protecting information.

International Cooperation

13. We encourage all States to enhance their physical protection of and accounting system for nuclear materials, emergency preparedness and response capabilities and relevant legal and regulatory framework. In this context, we encourage the international community to increase international cooperation and to provide assistance, upon request, to countries in need on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral level, as appropriate. In particular, we welcome the intent by the IAEA to continue to lead efforts to assist States, upon request. We also reaffirm the need for various public diplomacy and outreach efforts to enhance public awareness of actions taken and capacities built to address threats to nuclear security, including the threat of nuclear terrorism.

We will continue to make voluntary and substantive efforts toward strengthening nuclear security and implementing political commitments made in this regard. We welcome the information on the progress made in the field of nuclear security since the Washington Summit provided by the participants at this Seoul Summit. The next Nuclear Security Summit will be held in the Netherlands in 2014. 

"In Search of Sustainable CBRN Security Culture"

CITS is holding a workshop on security culture February 6-8 in Athens, Georgia. The workshop, titled "In Search of Sustainable CBRN Security Culture," aims to create a shared system to combat security threats related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear technologies. It is organized in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Stanley Foundation. The full concept document and agenda for the workshop are available online.

New Publication: The 1540 Compass

Dear colleagues:

Welcome to the first issue of the 1540 Compass, a journal of views, comments, and ideas for effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism by non-state actors. The journal is published by the Center for International Trade & Security at the University of Georgia (USA), in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. We encourage you to send your own contributions in the form of comments, suggestions, and full articles to compass@cits.uga.edu.

Steps needed to control illicit trafficking of nuclear material

Rasheed Khalid
Saturday, January 21, 2012

Islamabad

Original article

Hahn Choong-hee, spokesperson for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, South Korean Foreign Office, has said that preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons is fundamental to the security of nations and to the peace in the world.

He was addressing a roundtable discussion on ‘Aspects of nuclear safety, security and safeguards’ with special reference to Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul organised by the International Strategic Studies (CISS) in collaboration with South Korean Embassy here on Thursday. Former ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi, executive director of the CISS, conducted the proceedings.

Hahn said that the summit in Washington held in 2010, and upcoming event in South Korean capital in March next are trends to specify and address urgent global issue of nuclear terrorism. He said that international measures are required to control illicit trafficking and misuse of nuclear material and facilities by non-state actors.

He said that Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is an opportunity for important global attention and focus on this critical security issue. The goals will be to accentuate the global reach of proliferation threats, the broadly shared obligation to respond, the positive steps taken to reduce nuclear dangers and the essential role of the Security Council in addressing growing and pressing nuclear threats, he said.

Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal from Quaid-i-Azam University said that nuclear security threat is global in nature. Admittedly, he said, rhetorical consensus exists but practicality is missing. Thus, nuclear security necessitates responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation, he said.

On the issue of negative propaganda about Pakistan’s nuclear programme, he said that Pakistani security observers need to constitute a counter narrative to share the realistic facts about their nuclear programme, which is essential for the country’s defence.

He said that the threat from non-nuclear state is much bigger than nuclear states, which have security culture and are aware of nuclear dangers. He said that isotopes are dangerous for safety and security of a non-nuclear state using nuclear option for peaceful purposes due to the lack of nuclear security culture. Indeed, one needs to carefully examine why many analysts had pessimistic approach towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme, he observed. An objective response to irrational inquires certainly can counter the baseless propaganda, he said.

Additional Secretary (UN & EC), Munawwar Saeed Bhatti, said that safeguards, safety and security are important in their own right and must be pursued independent of each other. He said that in Pakistan our focus had been on inculcating a culture of safety and security at all levels.

For this Pakistan had a well-established programme for the application of nuclear technology for power generation, health, agriculture and industry. He said that Pakistan has a 4-decade long experience of safe operation of nuclear power plants. He said that being a fossil fuel deficient country, Pakistan would continue to rely on nuclear energy and enhance its share in the national energy mix.