New Books from CITS

Nuclear Security Culture: From National Best Practices to International Standards
Volume 28 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics
Edited by: I. Khripunov, N. Ischenko and J. Holmes
September 2007, approx. 168 pp., hardcover
ISBN: 978-1-58603-786-4 NEW

Over the past several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working on a definition of ‘nuclear security culture’ so that it can be used as a tool to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. A 2001 IAEA report titled ‘Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities’ identified security culture as one of the twelve principles underlying fissile-material security. In February 2005, at a summit in Bratislava, President Bush and President Putin vowed to step up joint efforts to bolster nuclear security, pairing disciplined, well-trained, responsible custodians and protective forces with well-maintained security systems. In July 2005, a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention was approved elevating the status of security culture to that of a treaty obligation. Since that time, IAEA member states worked on a concept, definition and guidelines for developing and implementing a robust security culture at nuclear facilities worldwide. This NATO workshop presents the views of experts with the hope to contribute to the IAEA’s work and facilitate nuclear security culture worldwide better. Issues include: Universality of nuclear security cultures; Nuclear security in a nation’s culture; Differences and similarities between regions such as US, European Union, Japan, etc.; and The advantages of similarities between the regions.

IOS Press
Nieuwe Hemweg 6B, 1013 BG Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 20 688 3355, Fax: +31 20 687 0039
E-mail: info@iospress.nl


Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism
Volume 29 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics
Edited by: I. Khripunov, L. Bolshov and D. Nikonov
October 2007, approx. 176 pp., hardcover
ISBN: 978-1-58603-787-1 NEW

The threat of radiological terrorism has recently come to the attention of the international community, as it became clear that terrorist organizations are seeking nuclear and radiological material to manufacture and use improvised nuclear devices (IND) and ‘dirty bombs’, and/or commit acts of sabotage against nuclear power infrastructure. But while nuclear weapons and INDs, still remain relatively secure from terrorist access, radiological material is more readily available in large quantities throughout the world. Also, radiological explosives or other dispersal devices are easier to manufacture and to use. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) come in many shapes and sizes; A dirty bomb uses a conventional explosion to scatter radioactive material; Terrorists could launch an attack by placing a container of radioactive material in a public place and an airplane can easily disperse radioactive material as a powder or an aerosol. On a grand scale, a nuclear facility could become an RDD. Intentional damage done to a nuclear power plant or other site could release radiation, contaminating the immediate surroundings or even beyond. RDDs of any kind present a potent and effective terrorist weapon because they threaten to expose civilian populaces to radiation – engendering panic out of proportion to the modest number of casualties likely to result from limited doses of radiation. Coming to terms with the psychological and social dimensions of radiological attacks – areas that are inadequately studied and assessed – is thus a matter of considerable importance for those entrusted with national, and ultimately international, security.
IOS Press
Nieuwe Hemweg 6B, 1013 BG Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 20 688 3355, Fax: +31 20 687 0039
E-mail: info@iospress.nl

U.S. and Russia Cooperation Continues on Nuclear Security

Newly Signed Fifth Bratislava Report Highlights Most Recent Advances in Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation

WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) Director Sergey Kiriyenko today submitted to Presidents Bush and Putin the fifth report on nuclear security cooperation between the two countries. The report is known as the Bratislava Report after the 2005 historic nonproliferation agreement between the two presidents. It details significant work completed by the United States and Russia over the past six months in the areas of emergency response, nuclear security procedures and best practices, security culture, research reactors, and nuclear site security.

“This latest report clearly shows that our joint efforts with Russia to secure and minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors are making the world safer,” Secretary Bodman said. “We are seeing steady progress on converting the world’s research reactors from using highly enriched uranium to using low enriched uranium that cannot be readily used in a nuclear weapon. In addition, work to improve security at facilities with nuclear material will be completed by 2008.”

The report, which is delivered to each president two times a year, highlights discussions between the two countries on preparing for nuclear emergencies and developing a strong nuclear security culture. It also includes information about upcoming work to convert a research reactor in Vietnam so that the highly enriched uranium can be returned to Russia. It highlights future efforts to return Russian-origin highly enriched uranium from Poland, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Libya, Serbia, and the Czech Republic. The successful return of over 80 kilograms of United States-origin highly enriched uranium from Australia and Japan is noted in the report.

One of the key aspects of the Bratislava agreement two years ago was the adoption of an accelerated schedule for upgrading security at sites with nuclear material in Russia. The report reaffirms each country’s commitment to the accelerated completion schedule and also highlights the recent Rosatom agreement regarding the sustainability of the U.S.-installed security upgrades.

During the 2005 meeting in Bratislava, U.S. President Bush and Russian President Putin committed both governments to securing nuclear weapons and material to prevent the possibility that such weapons or materials could fall into the hands of terrorists. The presidents established a group of senior officials to work together on nuclear security issues who would report the status of cooperation to the presidents. The next report is due in December 2007.

Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Visit the National Nuclear Security Administration homepage for more information.

International Core Group on Nuclear Security Culture

The International Core Group on Nuclear Security Culture was established as a follow-up to the October 2005 NATO Advanced Research Workshop "Nuclear Security Culture: From National Best Practices to International Standards." The main objectives of the CG are:

• Support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by facilitating and promoting the IAEA’s objectives vis-a-vis nuclear security culture
• Rally international support for the concept of nuclear security culture by working to achieve a common understanding that facilitates comparison, evaluation, improvement, and international cooperation in the field of nuclear security
• Promote a textured concept of nuclear security culture that takes into account varying national traditions, histories, and economic, social, and political realities

Members are being recruited to add geographic balance (e.g., representatives from Japan, Russia, Brazil, and UnitedStates) and multidisciplinary skills (e.g., specialists in industrial psychology and human-resource management). Members will take part in an informal capacity and in keeping with their preferences, limitations, and skills.

Core Group members can choose among several activities at their discretion:

• Remain on our mailing list to receive information regarding security culture
• Furnish advice and comments regarding security-culture-related activity (including through a web-based forum to be included in the WMD Security Culture website)
• Participate in research projects
• Review papers and reports
• Take part in workshops and conferences on behalf of the Core Group
• Provide training at educational and outreach sessions organized by CITS/UGA
• Contribute to the CITS/UGA WMD Security Culture website

Before the IAEA finalizes and approves its concept and definition of nuclear security culture and devises plans for implementation, CITS/UGA will work with the Core Group to:

• Exchange information and discuss strategies to promote nuclear security awareness in target countries. In recognition of the key role played by the public in nuclear security, we will conduct public lectures, briefings for the media, training for regional leaders, and other outreach activities as the opportunity presents itself. We will conduct such activities in concert with national authorities or local nongovernmental organizations. We will also craft generic model legal basis conducive to high standards of security awareness and culture.

• Encourage national legislatures in key countries to approve the July 2005 amendments to the Physical Protection Convention. We will pursue this effort jointly with local nongovernmental organizations and/or private entities. We will hold international workshops and briefings for parliamentarians and their staffs, to be attended by experts from other countries and by IAEA officials. CITS/UGA has compiled an enviable record in this sort of activity, specifically by encouraging national legislatures to enact rigorous export control laws. The contacts and trust we have established to promote export controls will be extremely useful in this endeavor. We will also open new channels of communication through members of the international Core Group. Since security culture is just one of the twelve fundamental principles to be added to the Physical Protection Convention, such events will be instrumental in educating legislators and major stakeholders.

After the IAEA releases its approved package of security-culture documents and guidelines, CITS/UGA, in cooperation with the Core Group, will:

• Contribute analysis and articles to a wide range of publications and the CITS WMD Security Culture website, and organize panels on nuclear security culture at relevant national and international conferences. We will use scholarly and applied research to raise the profile of security culture and promote a common understanding of the concept. One immediate objective is to assemble a panel for the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management, scheduled for July 2006 in Nashville, Tennessee. We will report among other things on the findings of our Moscow workshop and on our follow-up activities. Since CITS/UGA is a sustaining member of the INMM and most Core Group members are regular members-the INMM, which co-sponsored the Moscow workshop, awarded free 2006 memberships to all workshop attendees-we intend to organize Core Group activities to coincide with those of the INMM and to coordinate our agendas.

• Develop a modular training course consistent with IAEA guidelines that can be tailored to the specific needs and conditions of different regions. The ultimate objective is to develop a cadre of security-culture faculty available to participate in outreach and training projects. Of particular importance will be introducing security culture in countries that are about to embark on the development of nuclear power infrastructure. Nuclear personnel must undergo security-culture training, even before construction of this infrastructure begins.

• Develop and test different evaluation methodologies, preferably by conducting pilot projects in selected countries. One project we hope to undertake would focus on the former Soviet republics, which share important similarities resulting from their mutual communist past, common traditions of professional and organizational culture, and other bureaucratic, political, and social characteristics.

• Extend the basics of nuclear security culture to radiation sources and to non-nuclear areas such as chemical and biological research and production facilities. The latter effort will require extensive networking with experts in the chemical and biotechnology fields, along with outreach and focused research. We could compile briefing papers examining whether the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Health Organization (WHO) should manage this initiative within their fields of expertise, acting as counterparts to the IAEA. Some Core Group members from the EU countries have recognized the value of applying the principles underlying nuclear security culture to other sensitive areas and have urged us to consider doing this. We agree. We can develop a concept and help decision-makers at the IAEA, the OPCW, and the WHO discern the practical steps necessary to form a security-culture alliance.

Books and reports

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Nuclear Security Culture: the Case of Russia

released November 2004
PDF file: Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader

The Center for International Trade and Security and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) have published a landmark, peer-reviewed report designed to help governments prevent terrorists from obtaining the building blocks for nuclear weapons. Building on the preliminary study completed in 2002, the report points out that efforts to tighten up security at Russian nuclear installations have furnished Russia with adequate security equipment while by-and-large underestimating the importance of the human element of security. Without a skilled, motivated nuclear workforce, the best alarms and fences in the world will not keep fissile materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states. Indeed, faced with financial and other incentives, insiders might be tempted to remove materials entrusted to them, with dire consequences for homeland and international security.

The key insight conveyed in Nuclear Security Culture is that material fixes, while important, cannot be the ultimate solution to security problems. Leaky security is in great part a cultural problem. For example, foreign observers to Russian nuclear installations have reported seeing guards ignore security clearance procedures, cut the electricity to security hardware to save on power bills, and even deactivate annoying alarms. This deficient corporate culture, dubbed "security culture" by the authors, has allowed theft and diversion of dangerous substances to occur with troubling frequency. The report develops a model of corporate culture and recommends how leaders can apply this model to improve security at sensitive facilities. A draft training curriculum connects the everyday routine of nuclear workers with the higher purposes of national and international security, motivating them to perform their duties zealously.

While Russia is used as a case study, problems with security culture are by no means unique to Russia . Even the United States , as Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and "security czar" for the Department of Energy, points out in the preface to Nuclear Security Culture , is not immune to shortcomings in this area. The report aspires to provide standards that apply universally. Security culture is another element in the civilized world's defense-in-depth against nuclear terrorism.

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The Human Factor and Security Culture: Challenges to Safeguarding Fissile Materials in Russia
released November 2002
PDF file: Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader

Because it is extremely difficult to produce fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium – the key ingredients for nuclear weapons – terrorists and rogue states will likely attempt to acquire stolen materials. The greatest potential source of stolen fissile materials is Russia, where hundreds of tons of nuclear materials are at risk of theft. Over the last decade, there have been numerous thefts and attempted thefts of these materials from Russian nuclear facilities. Moreover, there is evidence that the al Qaeda and countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria have all attempted to obtain stolen fissile materials from Russia.

The United States has responded to these risks by funding several programs to help Russia improve its control over nuclear materials. The U.S. government has spent over $1.5 billion on these programs since their inception. For both political and technical reasons, however, the bulk of U.S. efforts have been focused more on the technical side of this problem?installing or enhancing equipment for physical protection and material accounting at Russian nuclear facilities.

While these technical upgrades are critically important, their efficient use depends on the extent to which nuclear site personnel are not only trained in technical skills, but also motivated and willing to perform these functions. There is growing evidence that Russian security culture is inconsistent with the nature and magnitude of modern threats, with personnel often failing to recognize the importance of following all the procedures and using the technologies necessary for protecting nuclear materials. Unless this issue is directly and comprehensively addressed, the Western security upgrades to Russian facilities will not be as efficient as originally thought.

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Security Culture in Germany
W.-D. Gutschmidt, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Germany

The standing of the terms „security“ and „culture“ is discussed. A brief overview about states and operators responsibilities linked to security culture is given, and a definition of the term “security culture” is explained. The security culture in German nuclear facilities is briefly discussed.

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Security Culture in the Nuclear Field
Jean Jalouneix, Denis Winter (IRSN)

By document referenced GOV/2001/41 of the 15th of August 2001, the Board of Governors of the IAEA ratified twelve fundamental principles of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. These principles will be integrated in the future revision of the International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The fundamental principle F proposes a definition of security culture and recommends that its implementation and its maintenance are a priority in the concerned organizations. It thus appears necessary to specify the concept of security culture.

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Training Of Guard Forces For The Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities
Axel Hagemann, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Cologne, Germany

The regulatory framework for physical protection in Germany requires a guard service capable of fulfilling its tasks and defines in detail the requirements on equipment, qualification, training and practice of the guard forces. There is also a clear requirement for exercises and practice in the context of required measures in order to support the deployment of the Police forces and cooperation with external authorities. Practice is an essential part of training and continuing professional development of guards. The benefits of conducting exercises are twofold: the results can be used as a basis for an evaluation and it can provide a tool for training. The training required in the regulations and in the license documents is subject to the supervision performed by the federal supervisory authorities. The required training is based on the design of the facility’s physical protection system based on the DBT which provides also the parameters for the exercises in physical protection matters. This presentation gives an overview about the training of the guard service in nuclear facilities and about the efforts to integrate physical protection practices into the emergency exercises in the safety field, which practices emergency situations beyond the design. The design of physical protection systems based on the Design Basis Threat (DBT) provides sound basic protection, which is supported by the actual training. The terrifying events of September 11th have shown that even though the DBT-based system design provides a strong protection against a wide range of credible threats, it is advisable to be better prepared also for the situation when the physical protection system fails or does not cover all the real circumstances and the real threat which could lead to an emergency situation.

Selected bibliography

• Security Culture in the Nuclear Field (Report by IRSN, France; Denis Winter, Chairman)
• “Index: Nuclear Weapons Security” (Project on Government Oversight)
• “NRC Issues Statement on Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants”
• “Conflict of interest may hurt nuke security”
• “Nuclear Security Enhancements since September 11, 2001”
• “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces” (National Intelligence Council; 2004, 2002)
  • http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_russiannuke04.html
  • http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_russiannucfac.html
• “Security Problems at U.S. Nuclear Facilities”
• “The Vulnerability of the UK’s Nuclear Facilities to Terrorism”
• “Nuclear Insecurity”
• “NRC Proposed Regulation Changes to Meet Design Basis Threat”
• “NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure that Power Plants are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel” (GAO Report, April 2005)
• Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report
• "Index: Safety and Security” (Nuclear Energy Institute)
• “Nuclear Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack” (Congressional Research Service)
• “NRC: Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to be Strengthened” (GAO Report, September 2003)
• “NRC: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Security at Nuclear Power Plants” (GAO Testimony, Sep. 14 2004)
• “Using Bilateral Mechanisms to Strengthen Physical Protection Worldwide”
• “ABC Investigation Finds Gaping Lapses in Security at Nuclear Reactors”
• “Loose Nukes: Inadequate Security Measures”
• “Lawmaker Faults Nuclear Facility Security Policies”
• “ICE Agents Arrest Illegal Aliens at Omaha Nuclear Plant”
• “OSC: Questions Remain on Energy Department Response to Nuclear Facilities Security Deficiencies”
• “Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terrorism Threat”
• “Facilities Security: Remarks for Energy Secretary Abraham"
• “DOE’s Domestic Nuclear Security Initiatives”
• “The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security”
• “Secretary Richardson Orders Additional Measures to Strengthen Security at Department of Energy Sites”
• “Inspector General Report: Some Oak Ridge Plant Guards Were Tipped Off to Security Exercise”
• “Guards sound alarm over security at Shearon Harris nuclear plant”
• “Nuclear Facility Transparency: Definitions and Concepts”
• “Nuclear agency moving toward security personnel reform”
• “Safeguards Culture” Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs -- Workshop Summary
• “Responding to the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism” Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (2005)
• “Upgrading Security at Nuclear Power Plants in the Newly Independent States”
• “Preventing a Nuclear 9/11”
• “Incentives for Nuclear Security”
• “Preview spoils nuclear plant security test”
• “Sustainability: A Vital Component of Nuclear Material Security in Russia”
• “Statement by the Union of Concerned Scientists to Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations”

Concept and definition

The concept of nuclear security culture continues to be the subject of debate and clarification, despite IAEA's efforts to arrive at a mutually acceptable definition and concept. Most experts agree that nuclear security culture is part of the overall organizational and professional culture in the industry or at specific facilities, which, in turn, is a function of the overall culture, tradition, and historical background in a country

One of the most recognized authorities on organizational culture is Edgar Schein's seminal work Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3d ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004). Schein's definition of organizational culture is considered to be one of the most comprehensive, and it reads that a culture is

“a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

IAEA's efforts to work out a definition of nuclear security culture originates in many ways from similar work done in 1980s and 1990s on nuclear safety culture. IAEA's International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group report defines nuclear safety culture as the

"assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals that, as an overriding priority, nuclear power plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance."

One of the more recent concepts and definitions of nucelar security culture came from CITS/UGA report "Nuclear Security Culture: the Case of Russia," stating that the concept can be characterized by

• the degree to which all personnel, from senior managers and supervisors down to the most junior operators, are aware of and committed to widely understood security requirements and best practices
• the degree to which available and affordable security technology is put to use, kept in good working condition, and improved
• the degree to which security regulations and procedures are implemented and personnel are motivated to accomplish their security-related tasks

However, many experts believe that there are both overlaps and inherent contradictions in the goals, objectives and elements of safety and security cultures, which warrant different approaches, or even do not allow for separation of the two concepts.

Regardless of the various opinions, it is clear that the sooner the international community has a working operational definition of nuclear security culture, the more effective will be the efforts to secure and protect nuclear and radioactive materials and sources.

About this project

Over the past several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working on a definition of “nuclear security culture” so that it can be used as a tool to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

Indeed, a 2001 IAEA report titled “Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities” identified security culture as one of the twelve principles underlying fissile-material security.

In February 2005, at their summit in Bratislava, President Bush and President Putin vowed to step up joint efforts to bolster security culture, pairing disciplined, well-trained, responsible custodians and protective forces with well-maintained security systems.

In July 2005, a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention was approved elevating the status of security culture to that of a treaty obligation. In October 2005, a NATO Advanced Research Workshop held in Moscow, Russia gathered over 90 international experts, attempting to build a consensus on the concept and definition of nuclear security culture by sharing national best practices in the management of fissile materials.

This website is designed to serve both as a resource and a forum for nuclear managers, policy-makers and researchers worldwide with the idea of contunuing the dialogue and discussion on nuclear security culture. Our main objective is to support and augment the ongoing IAEA activity by identifying existing trends, perceptions and approaches.