Nuclear Security Culture: the Case of Russia released November 2004
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The Center for International Trade and Security and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) have published a landmark, peer-reviewed report designed to help governments prevent terrorists from obtaining the building blocks for nuclear weapons. Building on the preliminary study completed in 2002, the report points out that efforts to tighten up security at Russian nuclear installations have furnished Russia with adequate security equipment while by-and-large underestimating the importance of the human element of security. Without a skilled, motivated nuclear workforce, the best alarms and fences in the world will not keep fissile materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states. Indeed, faced with financial and other incentives, insiders might be tempted to remove materials entrusted to them, with dire consequences for homeland and international security.
The key insight conveyed in Nuclear Security Culture is that material fixes, while important, cannot be the ultimate solution to security problems. Leaky security is in great part a cultural problem. For example, foreign observers to Russian nuclear installations have reported seeing guards ignore security clearance procedures, cut the electricity to security hardware to save on power bills, and even deactivate annoying alarms. This deficient corporate culture, dubbed "security culture" by the authors, has allowed theft and diversion of dangerous substances to occur with troubling frequency. The report develops a model of corporate culture and recommends how leaders can apply this model to improve security at sensitive facilities. A draft training curriculum connects the everyday routine of nuclear workers with the higher purposes of national and international security, motivating them to perform their duties zealously.
While Russia is used as a case study, problems with security culture are by no means unique to Russia . Even the United States , as Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and "security czar" for the Department of Energy, points out in the preface to Nuclear Security Culture , is not immune to shortcomings in this area. The report aspires to provide standards that apply universally. Security culture is another element in the civilized world's defense-in-depth against nuclear terrorism.
released November 2002
PDF file: Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader
Because it is extremely difficult to produce fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium – the key ingredients for nuclear weapons – terrorists and rogue states will likely attempt to acquire stolen materials. The greatest potential source of stolen fissile materials is Russia, where hundreds of tons of nuclear materials are at risk of theft. Over the last decade, there have been numerous thefts and attempted thefts of these materials from Russian nuclear facilities. Moreover, there is evidence that the al Qaeda and countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria have all attempted to obtain stolen fissile materials from Russia.
The United States has responded to these risks by funding several programs to help Russia improve its control over nuclear materials. The U.S. government has spent over $1.5 billion on these programs since their inception. For both political and technical reasons, however, the bulk of U.S. efforts have been focused more on the technical side of this problem?installing or enhancing equipment for physical protection and material accounting at Russian nuclear facilities.
While these technical upgrades are critically important, their efficient use depends on the extent to which nuclear site personnel are not only trained in technical skills, but also motivated and willing to perform these functions. There is growing evidence that Russian security culture is inconsistent with the nature and magnitude of modern threats, with personnel often failing to recognize the importance of following all the procedures and using the technologies necessary for protecting nuclear materials. Unless this issue is directly and comprehensively addressed, the Western security upgrades to Russian facilities will not be as efficient as originally thought.
Security Culture in Germany
W.-D. Gutschmidt, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Germany
The standing of the terms „security“ and „culture“ is discussed. A brief overview about states and operators responsibilities linked to security culture is given, and a definition of the term “security culture” is explained. The security culture in German nuclear facilities is briefly discussed.
Security Culture in the Nuclear Field
Jean Jalouneix, Denis Winter (IRSN)
By document referenced GOV/2001/41 of the 15th of August 2001, the Board of Governors of the IAEA ratified twelve fundamental principles of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. These principles will be integrated in the future revision of the International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The fundamental principle F proposes a definition of security culture and recommends that its implementation and its maintenance are a priority in the concerned organizations. It thus appears necessary to specify the concept of security culture.
Training Of Guard Forces For The Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities
Axel Hagemann, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Cologne, Germany
The regulatory framework for physical protection in Germany requires a guard service capable of fulfilling its tasks and defines in detail the requirements on equipment, qualification, training and practice of the guard forces. There is also a clear requirement for exercises and practice in the context of required measures in order to support the deployment of the Police forces and cooperation with external authorities. Practice is an essential part of training and continuing professional development of guards. The benefits of conducting exercises are twofold: the results can be used as a basis for an evaluation and it can provide a tool for training. The training required in the regulations and in the license documents is subject to the supervision performed by the federal supervisory authorities. The required training is based on the design of the facility’s physical protection system based on the DBT which provides also the parameters for the exercises in physical protection matters. This presentation gives an overview about the training of the guard service in nuclear facilities and about the efforts to integrate physical protection practices into the emergency exercises in the safety field, which practices emergency situations beyond the design. The design of physical protection systems based on the Design Basis Threat (DBT) provides sound basic protection, which is supported by the actual training. The terrifying events of September 11th have shown that even though the DBT-based system design provides a strong protection against a wide range of credible threats, it is advisable to be better prepared also for the situation when the physical protection system fails or does not cover all the real circumstances and the real threat which could lead to an emergency situation.
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