Promoting Nuclear Security Culture in the Developing World

08/04/2013 - Trieste, Italy

Nuclear and radioactive materials, though useful and beneficial in many fields including energy, medicine, agriculture and industry, could pose a danger to the environment and to the public if handled improperly.

To help developing countries build effective nuclear security strategies, ICTP and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are conducting the third annual "International School on Nuclear Security" in Trieste from 8 to 19 April 2013.

The school, which combines ICTP's international network of researchers in developing countries with IAEA nuclear security expertise, plays an essential role in supporting countries' efforts to prepare experts who are well equipped and qualified to analyse national nuclear security needs, prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or the use of nuclear and radioactive material for criminal or unauthorized acts, and prepare effective response measures to nuclear security events.

This year's school attracted 182 applicants, of which 48 were selected, representing 39 countries (7 of which are least-developed countries). Participants come from regulatory authorities, universities, research institutes, national ministries, and law enforcement agencies.

"One of the best ways to ensure the sustainability of a secure nuclear culture is through education and training," explained Tim Andrews of the IAEA's Department of Nuclear Safety and Security and one of the school's lecturers.

Co-sponsored by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the school was initially proposed by the Italian government in 2010 during a Nuclear Summit in Washington, DC, where a number of nations pledged their support to strengthen global nuclear security.

"This school is a clear sign of the commitment of the international community to ensuring nuclear security," said Giovanni Brauzzi, Deputy Director General/ Principal Director for Security, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in opening remarks at the school.

Brauzzi added, "Italy attaches great importance to the role that ICTP and the IAEA are taking as disseminators of nuclear security knowledge, especially in their 'training the trainer' approach."

More details about the school are available on its website.

Original link. 

CITS Senior Researcher Dmitriy Nikonov was one of the invited speakers at the School.

Nuclear Security Culture Assessment in Indonesia Underway

During the period of November 2012-February 2013, the National Nuclear Energy Agency of Indonesia (BATAN) is conducting a self-assessment of nuclear security culture at three of its research reactor facilities at Serpong, Bandung and Yogyakarta. Began in October 2012, this collaborative pilot project between BATAN and CITS/UGA is utilizing a self-assessment methodology, which is currently being developed by IAEA technical expert group, with the results of the process to be shared during the International Conference on Nuclear Security in Vienna in July 2013. 

BATAN self-assessment teams conduct surveys and interviews with select groups of facility employees to assess the status of security culture and identify gaps, which later will be addressed.

Examining Security Culture On A Case-by-Case Basis: Pelindaba Research Facility, 2007

By Gray Macfie

Security Leadership Fellow, CITS

By all accounts, the Pelindaba Research Facility in South Africa is a well-guarded facility, boasting security measures that make it one of the more insulated HEU research reactors in the nuclear industry.[1] Despite such protective measures, on the night of November 7^th 2007, a team of four attackers was able to infiltrate the facility and remain inside for 45 minutes, shooting emergency services officer Anton Gerber in the chest before ultimately leaving. As this four-man team was operating inside the facility, a second team fired upon retreating security forces from outside the perimeter.[2] Although no nuclear material was taken, the assault offers a unique opportunity to study CBRN security culture. The break-in at the Pelindaba facility was made possible not by a failure of physical measures, but instead by a lack of proper routines and practices.

The attack began with a team breaching the fence, picking a spot located in a ravine so as to be out of sight of guards. One man used plastic clips to raise the fence and crawl underneath. Once inside he shut off power to the fence so that the rest of the men could enter. While this relatively well-coordinated security breach took place out of direct sight from guards and the road, the entire 20-minute procedure was caught on camera. However, no guards sounded an alarm, raising a concern from some that the attackers had inside help. [3] Simple routine procedures could have alerted security personnel to the assault. Had the cameras been properly monitored and the break-in reported, it is very likely that they assault on the facility could have been drastically mitigated.

Undetected, the team walked ¾ of a mile inside the perimeter, where they ultimately made it to the emergency control center. Emergency services officer Anton Gerber sounded the alarm after sustaining a gunshot wound to the chest. Gerber estimates that it should have taken approximately three minutes for backup to arrive from the nearby security office. Instead it took security forces 24 minutes to respond. The team ultimately fled, but not before beating Gerber with a metal rod.2

As is often the case, inadequate security culture can be traced back to before the incident took place. In the months leading up to the incident, the South African Department of Energy and Minerals reported a lack of adequate security measures at the facility. A 2006-2007 report shows 0% completion of prescribed design basis threat.[4] In a sense, DBTs are the paradigm of proper security culture. A properly implemented design basis threat would likely have proved invaluable to the security culture of the facility. It would have helped foster a preparedness that was lacking at the time of the assault. 

The 2007 attack on the Pelindaba research facility was characterized by an inadequate and delayed response from security forces. As is the case with many security breaches, the human factor remains at the core of the break-in. The Pelindaba attack stands as a reminder to those working in the field of CBRN security that protective measures come not only in the form of alarms and fences, but in a pervading security culture of readiness and competence.

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[1] Bunn, Matthew. Securing the Bomb 2008. Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, November 2008.

[2] Zenko, Micah. “A Nuclear Site is Breached.” Washington Post. December 20, 2007.

[3] CBS News. “Nuke Facility Raid An Inside Job?” 60 Minutes. June 21, 2010

[4] Department of Minerals and Energy (South Africa). “Annual Report 2006/07,” 2007