CBRN Security Culture

"In Search of Sustainable CBRN Security Culture"

2012-02-08T11:39:00.003-05:00

CITS is holding a workshop on security culture February 6-8 in Athens, Georgia. The workshop, titled "In Search of Sustainable CBRN Security Culture," aims to create a shared system to combat security threats related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear technologies. It is organized in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Stanley Foundation. The full concept document and agenda for the workshop are available online.

New Publication: The 1540 Compass

2012-01-26T13:49:00.002-05:00

Dear colleagues,

Welcome to the first issue of the 1540 Compass, a journal of views, comments, and ideas for effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism by non-state actors. The journal is published by the Center for International Trade & Security at the University of Georgia (USA), in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. We encourage you to send your own contributions in the form of comments, suggestions, and full articles to compass@cits.uga.edu.

Steps needed to control illicit trafficking of nuclear material

2012-01-24T14:48:00.000-05:00

Rasheed Khalid
Saturday, January 21, 2012

Islamabad

Original article

Hahn Choong-hee, spokesperson for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, South Korean Foreign Office, has said that preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons is fundamental to the security of nations and to the peace in the world.

He was addressing a roundtable discussion on ‘Aspects of nuclear safety, security and safeguards’ with special reference to Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul organised by the International Strategic Studies (CISS) in collaboration with South Korean Embassy here on Thursday. Former ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi, executive director of the CISS, conducted the proceedings.

Hahn said that the summit in Washington held in 2010, and upcoming event in South Korean capital in March next are trends to specify and address urgent global issue of nuclear terrorism. He said that international measures are required to control illicit trafficking and misuse of nuclear material and facilities by non-state actors.

He said that Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is an opportunity for important global attention and focus on this critical security issue. The goals will be to accentuate the global reach of proliferation threats, the broadly shared obligation to respond, the positive steps taken to reduce nuclear dangers and the essential role of the Security Council in addressing growing and pressing nuclear threats, he said.

Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal from Quaid-i-Azam University said that nuclear security threat is global in nature. Admittedly, he said, rhetorical consensus exists but practicality is missing. Thus, nuclear security necessitates responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation, he said.

On the issue of negative propaganda about Pakistan’s nuclear programme, he said that Pakistani security observers need to constitute a counter narrative to share the realistic facts about their nuclear programme, which is essential for the country’s defence.

He said that the threat from non-nuclear state is much bigger than nuclear states, which have security culture and are aware of nuclear dangers. He said that isotopes are dangerous for safety and security of a non-nuclear state using nuclear option for peaceful purposes due to the lack of nuclear security culture. Indeed, one needs to carefully examine why many analysts had pessimistic approach towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme, he observed. An objective response to irrational inquires certainly can counter the baseless propaganda, he said.

Additional Secretary (UN & EC), Munawwar Saeed Bhatti, said that safeguards, safety and security are important in their own right and must be pursued independent of each other. He said that in Pakistan our focus had been on inculcating a culture of safety and security at all levels.

For this Pakistan had a well-established programme for the application of nuclear technology for power generation, health, agriculture and industry. He said that Pakistan has a 4-decade long experience of safe operation of nuclear power plants. He said that being a fossil fuel deficient country, Pakistan would continue to rely on nuclear energy and enhance its share in the national energy mix.

2011-09-01T08:51:00.001-04:00

2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul: Achieving Sustainable Nuclear Security Culture

By Igor Khripunov

Link to the original: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/08/nuclear_security_culture.php.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nuclear security culture is “the assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security.”[1] The concept of security culture emerged much later than nuclear safety culture, which was triggered by human errors that led to the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Much as these incidents confirmed the importance of nuclear safety, security culture has gained acceptance as a way to keep terrorist groups from acquiring radioactive materials and prevent acts of sabotage against nuclear power infrastructures. Safety and security culture share the goal of protecting human lives and the environment by assuring that nuclear power plants operate at acceptable risk levels.

The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, emphasized the importance of culture as a critical contributing factor to nuclear security:

The IAEA security culture design is based on the organizational culture model developed by Professor Edgar Schein of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).[1] Schein’s model was successfully used in the early 1990s to develop nuclear safety culture. In the security culture model it is founded on healthy respect for the threat. From the most senior leader to the technician, security measures must be a priority for the staff. This underlying conviction then permeates the way people work, driving their behavior under normal and abnormal conditions.

In a facility that enjoys a healthy security culture, personnel typically display a deep–rooted belief that there are credible insider and outsider threats, including theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer of material, and other malicious acts. They consider it their duty to counteract those threats. These beliefs form the foundation of nuclear security culture and are vitally important because they influence behavior to achieve objectives relating to nuclear non-proliferation and counterterrorism. Without this strong substructure of beliefs and attitudes, an effective nuclear security culture cannot exist. Efforts to instill such beliefs and attitudes must be carefully calibrated to reach everyone working in the facility and not only the organization’s security professionals. The local community ―a potential first line of defense against external threats― also must be familiar with the substructure of security ideology.

If beliefs and attitudes constitute the foundation of a security culture architecture, the next stage includes principles to filter beliefs and attitudes in order to develop sound policies and procedures.[2] These principles include motivation, leadership, commitment and responsibility, professionalism and competence, and learning and improvement. The entire workforce should be inculcated with these principles and―to show that leadership is dedicated to security―presented with proof that these principles are applied consistently across the organization. Three major elements exist at the administrative core of security culture development: facility leadership behavior and style, proactive policies and procedures for reaching the objective, and the ultimate goal, personnel performance. The promotion of an effective security culture will inspire characteristics of personnel behavior that include personal accountability, adherence to procedures, teamwork, and vigilance.

The performance of leaders is the main element within the facility. They need to lead by example to forge the appropriate pattern of ideas and perceptions by staff. Managers must emphasize roles and responsibilities, visible security policies and cyber–protection. The role of the leader in promoting security culture is particularly important in societies with strong paternalistic traditions where the decision–making process is highly centralized.

The 2012 Summit in Seoul needs to focus on at least four specific measures contributing to the sustainability of nuclear security culture in individual countries and globally. The improvement of security culture is a continuous process. In the absence of a terrorist attack against nuclear power infrastructure, the element of sustainability plays a critical role in countering low motivation and complacency.

First: Two-Tiered Approach Anchored in National Values and Culture

The 2010 Summit encouraged the integration of security culture into general societal values instead of focusing on the facility–based model currently favored by the IAEA. Thus, a proposed two–tiered architecture would consist of 1) the facility–based model at the micro level, deriving its strength in part from national perceptions and relevant policies toward nuclear issues, and 2) general societal values at the macro–level. Ideally, these two levels combined will harness the human component to generate a more sustainable nuclear security culture.

If nuclear security represents a societal value, the macro–level input from national culture will reinforce efforts at the facility level. The input expected at the macro-level would include: a) nature of compliance with international legal instruments and participation in assistance programs; b) weight placed on nuclear security by the national leadership; c) consistency with which the nuclear industry focuses on nuclear security and related issues; d) criminalization and punishment of crimes associated with nuclear material and the security of nuclear installations; e) general public awareness of and involvement in security matters; and f) a greater role for educational institutions and universities

The performance and sustainability of a nuclear security regime ultimately hinge on security perceptions shaped by national and industry leaders. Weak input from the macro level must not discourage efforts at the micro level. Ideally, the two levels should work together toward promoting and popularizing nuclear security culture.

A sustainable security culture will depend on the efforts of individual countries to assimilate generic international standards into their national culture as well as integrate it into their established organizational culture as a subset. In practice, this means that the ongoing IAEA Regional Training Workshops need to be followed by training events in individual countries that would attempt to adjust their generic standards to prevailing national practice, values and traditions. Such efforts may require a multidisciplinary approach involving a wide range of non-technical experts.

Second: “Selling” the Security Culture

It needs to be recognized and widely publicized that security culture goes beyond traditional perceptions of physical protection and can yield numerous other benefits. Security culture would encourage the workforce to remain vigilant, question irregularities, execute its work diligently, and exhibit high standards of personal and collective accountability. While not a panacea, it can contribute to a vibrant and robust security regime and is applicable to the entire workforce. It is also responsive to a threat milieu in which risks are too numerous to predict, even for the most farsighted leader. Other potential benefits include better information technology security and protection of trade secrets; improved safety arrangements; reduced across–the–board theft and diversion; reduced risks of vandalism and sabotage by employees and outsiders; lower insurance rates; improved mechanisms for personnel control and accounting under emergency conditions; and better relationships with local authorities and surrounding communities. Also, an institutionalized security culture across the nuclear sector, introduced in coordination with the government, may facilitate auditing and inspections when government officials verify compliance with security and other standards.

The shift toward an effective nuclear security culture is characterized by the recognition of security as an investment rather than a burdensome expense. Also, the overall perspective of security moves beyond threats, vulnerability, and protection and integrates efficiency, organizational continuity, and the preservation of trust.

Third: Reinforcing the Safety-Security Nexus

At the site of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, “We need to build a stronger connection between nuclear safety and security. Though nuclear safety and security are distinct issues, boosting one can bolster the other. At a time when terrorists and others are seeking nuclear materials and technology, stringent safety systems at nuclear power plants will reinforce efforts to strengthen nuclear security. A nuclear power plant that is safer for its community is also one that is secure for our world.”

Safety culture is guided by the principle of transparency and across-the-board involvement, while security is focused on intelligence gathering and confidentiality, including post-event investigation. Leadership must arrange procedures so that security and safety measures reinforce, rather than handicap each other.

Safety and security measures need to be built into a plant throughout all phases of its service life, from design and construction to routine operation and decommissioning. Safety and security should begin at the drawing board, with assessment of candidate sites for the plant and the design of the installation itself. Assessing and continuously reassessing risk from safety and security angles is crucial throughout the plant’s lifetime. Realistic safety and security risk estimates factor in a wide range of hazards, not to mention combinations of hazards, both natural and man-made. Confronted with complex disasters, nuclear managers must organize, recruit, train, and lead safety and security personnel in a way that helps the leadership react flexibly and quickly. Instilling the right habits and traits—the optimal overlap of safety and security culture—is critical.

Fourth: Evaluation of the Nuclear Security Culture

The challenge in evaluating security culture is that culture is composed of intangible human characteristics like positive attitudes, high morale, ethics, teamwork, and the organization’s reputation. Trends charted over a period of time can provide early warning to management to investigate the causes behind the observed changes and reinforce sustainability. In addition to monitoring changes and trends, it may also be necessary to compare the indicators against identified targets and goals, evaluating the staff’s strengths and weaknesses.

There are two options to evaluate nuclear security culture:

1) Basic: Positive Indicators

Percentage of employees who have received security refresher training during the previous month/quarter;
Percentage of security improvement proposals implemented during the previous month/quarter;
Percentage of improvement teams involved in determining solutions to security related problems;
Percentage of employee communication briefs that include security information;
Number of security inspections conducted by senior managers/managers/supervisors during the previous week/month (a security inspection may be combined with a housekeeping inspection);
Percentage of employee suggestions relating to security improvement;
Percentage of routine organizational meetings with security as an agenda item.

Positive security indicators serve as a mechanism for giving recognition to employees who improve security by thought, action or commitment. Recognition for achievement is a powerful motivating force to encourage continued improvement.

2) Intermediate: Security Performance Indicators

They are designed to show a level of performance that is deteriorating or not acceptable. Each facility can develop its own set of indicators which would best meet its needs. This methodology is currently used by the IAEA to enable state parties to evaluate nuclear security culture at their facilities. The actual values of the indicators are not intended to be direct measures of security, although security performance can be inferred from the results achieved. The numerical value of any individual indicator may be of no significance if treated in an isolated manner, but can be significant when considered in the context of the performance of the other indicators. The problem—recently discovered—with this approach is that it is difficult to develop predictive indicators as indicators are often either too easy to manipulate or are not sensitive enough to allow for early intervention.

The IAEA needs to develop a comprehensive and internationally acceptable methodology for evaluating nuclear security culture and widely disseminate it for practical use. In addition to strengthening sustainability, it will promote cooperation and the sharing of best practices.
The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit elevated the reliability of the human factor to the top of the nuclear security agenda. A vehicle to improve the human factor is security culture, which connotes not only the technical proficiency of the people but also their awareness of proliferation risks and motivation to follow established security procedures, comply with regulations, and take initiative when unforeseen circumstances arise. A workforce made up of individuals who are vigilant, question irregularities, execute their work diligently, and exhibit high standards of personal and collective behavior will maintain tight security. There is no way to make the world’s expanding nuclear power infrastructure safe and secure other than to make allies of the people entrusted with operating nuclear power plants. The 2012 Summit in Seoul must go beyond the conceptualization of nuclear security culture and embark on the path of effective implementation. Given the cross-cutting role of the human factor, its successful outcome will largely depend on the extent to which it can formulate specific measures and recommendations which would ultimately contribute to a sustainable security culture.

Dr. Igor Khripunov is Distinguished Fellow and Adjunct Professor at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security. Dr. Khripunov joined the University of Georgia in 1992 after a distinguished career in the Soviet/Russian Foreign Service. His expertise includes nonproliferation export control, physical protection and vulnerability assessment, nuclear security culture, safety-security interface and organizational culture. He is a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and participates in a wide range of IAEA sponsored events. Dr. Khripunov has contributed to a number of books and book chapters on nuclear energy development, nonproliferation and other global issues; he has written numerous articles published in journals, including Comparative Strategy, Security Dialogue, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Problems of Post-Communism, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

[1] “Nuclear Security Culture: Implementing Guide,” IAEA Nuclear Security Series 7 (2008): 3.

[2] Edgar Schein, 3rd ed., Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey–Bass, 2004).

[3] Edgar Schein, The Corporate Culture: Survival Guide (San Francisco: Jossey–Bass, 1999), 15–26.

2011-04-13T09:44:00.006-04:00

School on Nuclear Security

Nuclear Security School co-director Andrea Braunegger-Guelich of the IAEA.

11/04/2011 - Trieste

Link to the original story.

While the effects of the recent Japan earthquake on its nuclear energy facilities have raised worldwide concerns about nuclear safety, nuclear security--measures to prevent nuclear proliferation or sabotage, as well as the protection of nuclear materials--is a topic of equal importance and is the theme of a two-week school organized by ICTP and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The 'International School on Nuclear Security', held in Trieste from 11 to 22 April, brings together IAEA expertise and ICTP's international network of researchers in developing countries. The School's aim is to provide participants with the knowledge they need to meet obligations under the international nuclear security legal framework, to identify and remedy threats against nuclear security by using radiation detection strategies, and to respond to incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material.

"Countries need to be more prepared for potential threats. The School helps to develop an international nuclear security culture," said School co-director Andrea Braunegger-Guelich, also of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security.

The Italian government initially proposed the School at last year's Nuclear Summit in Washington, where a number of nations pledged their support to strengthen global nuclear security. Italy, ICTP's chief sponsor, included the Trieste school amongst its nuclear security action plans.

ICTP actively supports a number of joint educational activities with the IAEA geared towards building competence in developing countries, including the School of Nuclear Knowledge Management, which has been successfully conducted at ICTP for the past six years.

Facts about the School:

250 applications
50 participants from 43 countries
20% women
Participants come from regulatory authorities, universities, research institutes, different national ministries, and law enforcement agencies

More details about the School are available on its website.

The School is co-sponsored by the Central European Initiative and the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science.

New IAEA Security Series Document

2011-04-06T09:04:00.002-04:00

The International Atomic Energy Agency has released its Nuclear Security Series No. 15 document, entitled "Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Controls," which is a euphemism for missing or stolen material. The document was produced jointly with several international organizations, including EUROPOL, ICAO, ICPO-INTERPOL, UNICRI, UNODC, and WCO. Nuclear security culture is an underpinning element, recommended at all levels of ensuring nuclear and radioactive material security, including prevention, detection and response, and mitigation. Full document is available here.

CITS Hosts Nuclear Security Culture Panel in Washington D.C.

2011-04-04T09:38:00.003-04:00

The Center for International Trade & Security hosted a panel discussion entitled "The Human Dimension of Nuclear Security" immediately following the 2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington D.C. The event took place Wednesday, March 30th from 9:00am - 12:00pm at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Panelists included Laura Holgate from the National Security Council, Charles Ferguson from the Federation of American Scientists, Roger Howsley from the World Institute of Nuclear Security, Jean Jalouneix from the Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, Mary Alice Hayward from Areva USA, and Kara De Castro from the NNSA. Panel transcript is available here.

U.S. National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon on Security Culture

2011-04-04T08:40:00.003-04:00

“But nuclear security is more than about protecting material with guards, guns, and gates. It also means addressing the human element by establishing a security culture and training programs for the personnel responsible for protecting nuclear materials. Since the Washington summit, we have signed agreements with Japan, China, South Korea, and India to establish and work together at regional “Centers of Excellence” to provide training and education for nuclear security officials. During the President’s recent trip, Brazil agreed to consider establishing a similar regional center for Latin America. Other training facilities are being established in Italy, Kazakhstan and Algeria. [emphasis added]

Nuclear security requires funding, but it is money well spent. For its part, the Obama Administration has committed an additional $10 billion to the Global Partnership to help countries pay for nuclear and biosecurity upgrades. In this respect, I want to emphasize the President’s commitment to securing adequate funding for the U.S. nuclear security and nonproliferation programs in the FY 2011 and FY2012 budgets. Even in these difficult financial times, we cannot afford to skimp on essential national security needs.”

Read entire speech from the 2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference here.

Nuclear Security Culture: Concept, Implementation and Evaluation

2011-02-09T12:52:00.002-05:00

Dr. Igor Khripunov, Distinguished Fellow and Adjunct Professor at the Center for International Trade and Security, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia, gives a presentation on nuclear security culture to students of the Monterey Institute at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He defines security culture as an attempt to merge together the human factor and technologies so they interact in a smooth way. He argues that nuclear security violations are due to a breakdown of the human factor and talks about the implications of the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit and what can be done as we move ahead to the next Security Summit in 2012.

Nuclear Security Summit Calls for Stronger Security Culture

2010-04-15T11:37:00.007-04:00

Over 40 heads of state gathered in Washington, DC in April to discuss ways to secure vulnerable fissile material and nuclear facilities around the world. The official summit Communiqué and the Work Plan below emphasize the importance that nuclear security culture plays in ensuring that fissile materials do not fall into the wrong hands, and outline steps needed to achieve it.

Communique of Nuclear Security Summit

The final communique Tuesday of the 47-nation Nuclear Security Summit in Washington:

Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials. In addition to our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we also all share the objective of nuclear security. Therefore those gathered here in Washington, D.C., on April 13, 2010, commit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Success will require responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation.

We welcome and join President Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, as we work together to enhance nuclear security. Therefore, we:

1. Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control; to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes; and emphasize the importance of robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security;

2. Call on States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary;

3. Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions and agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as appropriate; and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible;

4. Endeavor to fully implement all existing nuclear security commitments and work toward acceding to those not yet joined, consistent with national laws, policies and procedures;

5. Support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture;

6. Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its Statute, relevant General Conference resolutions and its Nuclear Security Plans;

7. Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations as well as the contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G-8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction within their respective mandates and memberships;

8. Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, and training; and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance;

9. Recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking; and agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies;

10. Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture;

11. Support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security; and

12. Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances and encourage efforts to secure those materials as well.

Maintaining effective nuclear security will require continuous national efforts facilitated by international cooperation and undertaken on a voluntary basis by States. We will promote the strengthening of global nuclear security through dialogue and cooperation with all states. Thus, we issue the Work Plan as guidance for national and international action including through cooperation within the context of relevant international fora and organizations. We will hold the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea in 2012.

The White House Office of the Press Secretary

Work Plan of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit

This Work Plan supports the Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. It constitutes a political commitment by the Participating States to carry out, on a voluntary basis, applicable portions of this Work Plan, consistent with respective national laws and international obligations, in all aspects of the storage, use, transportation and disposal of nuclear materials and in preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information required to use such material for malicious purposes.

Recognizing the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as an important legally binding multilateral instrument addressing threats posed by acts of nuclear terrorism:

1. Participating States Parties to the Convention will work together to achieve universality of the Convention, as soon as possible;

2. Participating States Parties to the Convention will assist States, as appropriate and upon their request, to implement the Convention; and

3. Participating States Parties to the Convention encourage discussions among States Parties to consider measures to ensure its effective implementation, as called for in Article 20 of the Convention.

Recognizing the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as the only multilateral legally binding agreement dealing with the physical protection of nuclear material in peaceful uses, and the value of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention in strengthening global security:

1. Participating States Parties to the Convention will work towards its universal adherence and where applicable, to accelerate the ratification processes of the Amendment to the Convention and to act for early implementation of that Amendment;

2. Participating States Parties to the Convention call on all States to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force; and

3. Participating States Parties to the Convention will assist States, as appropriate and upon their request, to implement the Convention and the Amendment.

Noting the need to fully implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) on preventing non-State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials, in particular as it relates to nuclear material:

1. Participating States support the continued dialogue between the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 and States and support strengthened international cooperation in this regard, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions and within the framework of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy;

2. Participating States support the activities of the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 to promote full implementation;

3. Participating States recognize the importance of complete and timely reporting as called for by UNSCR 1540, and will work with other States to do so, including by providing technical support or assistance, as requested;

4. Participating States note the outcome of Comprehensive Review by the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and express their support for ensuring the effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

5. With respect to the nuclear security-related aspects of Paragraph 3, sections (a) and (b) of UNSCR 1540, Participating States recognize the importance of evaluating and improving their physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series documents and as contained in the document “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” (INFCIRC/225); and

6. Participating States in a position to do so are encouraged to provide technical assistance to those States that request it through appropriate mechanisms, including through the Committee’s efforts to match needs with available resources.

Welcoming IAEA activities in support of national efforts to enhance nuclear security worldwide and commending the work of the IAEA for the provision of assistance, upon request, through its Nuclear Security Programme and for the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010 – 2013, approved by the Board of Governors in September 2009 and noted by the IAEA General Conference, and welcoming IAEA programs to advance new technologies to improve nuclear security and nuclear materials accountancy.

Recognizing that the IAEA is facilitating the development by member states, in the framework of the Nuclear Security Series, of guidance and recommendations relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving, inter alia, nuclear material, and associated facilities, and is providing guidance in developing and implementing effective nuclear security measures.

Noting that pursuit of the objectives of this Work Plan will not be interpreted so as to alter the mandate or responsibilities of the IAEA:

1. Participating States note that the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series of documents provides recommendations and guidance to assist States in a wide range of aspects of nuclear security, and encourage the widest possible participation by all its member states in the process;

2. Participating States in a position to do so, will work actively with the IAEA towards the completion and implementation, as appropriate, of the guidance provided by the Nuclear Security Series, and to assist, upon request, other States in doing so;

3. Participating States in particular welcome and support the IAEA’s efforts to finalize the fifth revision of the recommendations contained in INFCIRC/225, which will be published in the Nuclear Security Series;

4. Participating States recognize the importance of nuclear material accountancy in support of nuclear security and look forward to the completion of the technical guidance document on “Nuclear Material Accountancy Systems at Facilities”;

5. Participating States will endeavor to incorporate, as appropriate, the relevant principles set out in the Nuclear Security Series documents, into the planning, construction, and operation of nuclear facilities;

6. Participating States, when implementing their national nuclear security measures, will support the use of the IAEA Implementing Guide on the Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat to elaborate their national design basis threat as appropriate, to include the consideration of outsider and insider threats;

7. Participating States welcome the IAEA’s efforts to assist States to develop, upon request, Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans to consolidate their nuclear security needs into integrated plans for nuclear security improvements and assistance;

8. Participating States recognize the value of IAEA support mechanisms such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions to review, as requested, their physical protection systems for civilian nuclear material and facilities; and

9. Participating States call upon all member states of the IAEA in a position to do so to provide the necessary support to enable the IAEA to implement these important activities.

Noting the contributions to the promotion of nuclear security by the U.N. and initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, as well as other bilateral, regional, multilateral, and nongovernmental activities within their respective mandates and memberships:

1. Participating States will work together, as appropriate, to ensure that nuclear security cooperation mechanisms are complementary, reinforcing, efficient, consistent with related IAEA activities, and appropriately matched to identified needs in those States requesting assistance;

2. Participating States encourage, where appropriate, expanded participation in and commitment to international initiatives and voluntary cooperative mechanisms aimed at improving nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism; and

3. Participating States welcome the intent of the members of the G-8 Global Partnership, in a position to do so, to undertake additional programming to enhance nuclear security.

Recognizing States’ rights to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and noting the responsibility of each State for the use and management of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction and recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are particularly sensitive and require special precautions:

1. Participating States will consider, where appropriate, the consolidation of national sites where nuclear material is held;

2. Participating States will continue to exercise particular care in ensuring the safe and secure transport of nuclear materials, both in domestic and international transport;

3. Participating States, where appropriate, will consider on a national basis the safe, secure and timely removal and disposition of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them;

4. Participating States will continue to exercise particular care in securing and accounting for separated plutonium, taking into consideration the potential of various forms for use in a nuclear explosive device;

5. Participating States will consider, where appropriate, converting highly-enriched-uranium fueled research reactors, and other nuclear facilities using highly enriched uranium, to use low enriched uranium, where it is technically and economically feasible;

6. Participating States, as appropriate, will collaborate to research and develop new technologies that require neither highly enriched uranium fuels for reactor operation nor highly enriched uranium targets for producing medical or other isotopes, and will encourage the use of low enriched uranium and other proliferation-resistant technologies and fuels in various commercial applications such as isotope production;

7. Participating States in a position to do so will provide assistance to those States requesting assistance to secure, account for, consolidate, and convert nuclear materials; and

8. Participating States will consider how to best address the security of radioactive sources, as well as consider further steps as appropriate.

Mindful of the responsibilities of every Participating State to maintain effective nuclear security and a robust domestic regulatory capacity:

1. Participating States will establish and maintain effective national nuclear security regulations, including the periodic review and adjustment of the regulations as the State considers appropriate;

2. Participating States undertake to maximize regulatory independence, consistent with each State’s particular legal and institutional structures;

3. Participating States will undertake to build regulatory capacity and ensure sufficiently trained and fully vetted professional nuclear security staff and adequate resources, taking into account current needs and future expansion of their respective nuclear programs; and

4. Participating States will pursue the review and enforcement of compliance with national nuclear security regulations as a matter of priority.

Understanding the role of the nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and recognizing that national governments are responsible for standard setting within each State:

1. Participating States will work, in guiding the nuclear industry, to promote and sustain strong nuclear security culture and corporate commitment to implement robust security practices, including regular exercises and performance testing of nuclear security features, consistent with national regulations;

2. Consistent with State requirements, Participating States will facilitate exchange of best practices, where legally and practically feasible, in nuclear security in the nuclear industry, and in this respect, will utilize relevant institutions to support such exchanges; and

3. Participating States encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.

Emphasizing the importance of the human dimension of nuclear security, the need to enhance security culture, and the need to maintain a well-trained cadre of technical experts:

1. Participating States will promote cooperation, as appropriate, among international organizations, governments, industries, other stakeholders, and academia for effective capacity building, including human resources development in nuclear security programs;

2. Participating States will encourage the creation of and networking among nuclear security support centres for capacity building to disseminate and share best practices and will support IAEA activities in this area;

3. Participating States encourage the creation of adequate national nuclear security capacities, and encourage supplier countries and technology suppliers to support those capacities in the recipient countries, including human resources development through education and training, upon request and consistent with each State’s particular legal and institutional structures;

4. Participating States will encourage an integrated approach to education and training and institutional capacity building by all stakeholders having a key role in establishing and maintaining adequate security infrastructure; and

5. Participating States will encourage the implementation of national measures to ensure the proper management of sensitive information in order to prevent illicit acquisition or use of nuclear material, and, where appropriate, will support bilateral and multilateral capacity building projects, upon request.

Underscoring the value of exchanging accurate and verified information, without prejudice to confidentiality provisions, to detect, prevent, suppress, investigate, and prosecute acts or attempted acts of illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism:

1. Participating States will strive to improve their national criminal laws, as needed, to ensure that they have the adequate authority to prosecute all types of cases of illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism and commit to prosecuting these crimes to the full extent of the law;

2. Participating States are encouraged to develop and apply mechanisms to expand sharing of information on issues, challenges, risks and solutions related to nuclear security, nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trafficking in a comprehensive and timely manner; and

3. Participating States are encouraged to develop methods and mechanisms, where appropriate, to enhance bilateral and multilateral collaboration in sharing urgent and relevant information on nuclear security and incidents involving illicit nuclear trafficking.

Noting the IAEA’s and Participating States’ work in the field of nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, aimed at assisting States in connection with the detection of and response to illicitly trafficked nuclear material, and determination of its origin, and recognizing the importance of respecting provisions on confidentiality of information:

1. Participating States will consider taking further steps, nationally, bilaterally or multilaterally, to enhance their technical capabilities, including the appropriate use of new and innovative technologies, to prevent and combat illicit nuclear trafficking;

2. Participating States will explore ways to work together to develop national capacities for nuclear forensics, such as the creation of national libraries and an international directory of points of contact, to facilitate and encourage cooperation between States in combating illicit nuclear trafficking , including relevant IAEA activities in this area; and

3. Participating States will explore ways to enhance broader cooperation among local, national and international customs and law enforcement bodies to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and acts of nuclear terrorism, including through joint exercises and sharing of best practices.

April 13, 2010

Russia, U.S. Hold Nuclear Security Talks

2009-10-02T10:33:00.000-04:00

September 29, 2009

DOE Deputy Secretary and Rosatom Director Visit Y-12, Oak Ridge National Laboratory During First Meeting of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group
Discussions emphasize mutual efforts to counter emerging threats to nuclear materials and cooperation on civil nuclear technologies

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Department of Energy today announced that Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman and Director General of the State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom” Sergei Kiriyenko held the first meetings of the joint U.S.-Russian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group on Monday, September 28 and Tuesday, September 29.

The meetings opened with a session hosted by U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, who met with Director Kiriyenko and Deputy Secretary Poneman to discuss a variety of issues. These included the two countries’ mutual work securing vulnerable nuclear materials, efforts to increase cooperation on civil nuclear technologies, and cooperation on other nuclear security issues.

The meetings, which concluded with a plenary session co-chaired by Deputy Secretary Poneman and Director Kiriyenko this morning, were the first since the working group was established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the July 2009 Presidential Summit. In addition to discussions in Washington, the meetings included a visit by Director Kiriyenko and Deputy Secretary Poneman to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Y-12 National Security Complex and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, Tenn.

“The United States and Russia have a long and successful track record of cooperation in the area of nuclear security,” said Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman. “These meetings and our visits to Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex demonstrate how seriously our countries take our shared responsibility to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy while combating nuclear dangers. I look forward to continuing this record by expanding our cooperation in fulfillment of our Presidents’ Joint Statement.”

“This visit is devoted to an in depth discussion of the issues of nuclear energy and nuclear security as stipulated by the mandate from the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States,” said Director Kiriyenko. “We are looking forward to the expansion of our bilateral cooperation on these issues.”

The Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group was established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the July 2009 Presidential Summit and is co-chaired by Deputy Secretary Poneman and Director Kiriyenko. As stated in their Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized the special responsibility of the United States and Russia for security of nuclear weapons and agreed to broaden and deepen U.S.-Russian long-term cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world.

After their meeting with Secretary Chu, Deputy Secretary Poneman and Director Kiriyenko flew to Tennessee to visit ORNL and Y-12, where they observed a joint nuclear security training exercise. At Y-12, Deputy Secretary Poneman and Director Kiriyenko also discussed nuclear materials management issues and toured the recently completed Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility.

During their visit to ORNL, Director Kiriyenko and Deputy Secretary Poneman received a briefing at the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center and the Spallation Neutron Source.

For photos of the visit by Deputy Secretary Poneman and Director Kiriyenko to ORNL and Y-12, click here.

While Deputy Secretary Poneman and Director Kiriyenko toured ORNL and Y-12, the remaining U.S. and Russian members of the working group met in Washington to discuss a wide range of topics, including cooperation on nuclear security, nuclear safeguards, nuclear materials consolidation, nuclear emergency operations, and civil nuclear energy cooperation.

As a result of the meeting, a joint action plan formulated by the working group will be forwarded to President Obama and President Medvedev through U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov serve as the Bilateral Commission Coordinators.

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Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science in the nation’s national security enterprise. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; reduces the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad. Visit www.nnsa.energy.gov for more information.

U.S. And Russia Complete Nuclear Security Upgrades Under Bratislava Initiative

2008-12-24T13:19:00.003-05:00

The U.S. Department of Energy today delivered the Bratislava Nuclear Security report to the White House, which detailed the status of work agreed to by Presidents Bush and Putin in Bratislava in 2005. U.S. and Russian officials from the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the U.S. Department of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Defense and State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom” reviewed work to complete nuclear security upgrades in Russia at meetings in Moscow last week. Building on this success, both countries will continue to actively pursue additional Presidential objectives. Read more...

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: an Agenda for the Next President

2008-11-19T10:29:00.003-05:00

In this summary of the more comprehensive "Securing the Bomb 2008" report, Matthew Bunn and Andrew Newman argue for a better coordinated approach from the new U.S. administration towards improving nuclear security and countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. Specifically, they advocate filling a senior position within the National Security Council spearheading the overall U.S. government effort in these areas, and allocating up to $500 million to this office.

One of the recommendations is for the new adminstration to work with other key nations to improve sustainability of nuclear security upgrades and improve security culture -- as was emphasized in the 2005 Bush-Putin Bratislava Initiative. With the IAEA Security Culture Implementing Guide in place, all that is needed is for the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities to become legally binding. This is, however, still a remote possibility with only 19 states accepting or ratifying the document, as of October 2008, out of 60+ needed for it to come into force.

NNSA Secures One of the World’s Largest Nuclear Storage Facilities

2008-11-16T11:56:00.006-05:00

NNSA Helps Increase Security for Tens of Tons of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material

A major cooperative effort to secure weapons-grade nuclear material is now completed at the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk, Russia, a senior official with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) said today, calling it a milestone in joint nuclear security work. It is the largest nuclear materials storage facility that NNSA has completed security upgrades on to date. Over the past decade, NNSA and Rosatom, Russia's nuclear energy and materials entity, have been working on the modernization of security measures at the long-term storage facility, which holds highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Read full story...

IAEA Releases Nuclear Security Culture Implementing Guide

2008-11-12T09:56:00.006-05:00

After several years of development, deliberation, and approvals from member-states, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released an Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Culture (STI/PUB/1347). The 24-page document discusses the concept and characteristics of nuclear security culture, the importance of human factor in nuclear security, and specific roles of institutions and individuals in implementing an effective nuclear security regime. Nuclear security culture became a component in the Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities (CPPNM) (Fundamental Principle F), and, after CPPNM comes into force, will become mandatory for implementation by member-states of the IAEA.

New Books from CITS

2007-10-01T13:02:00.007-04:00

Nuclear Security Culture: From National Best Practices to International Standards
Volume 28 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics
Edited by: I. Khripunov, N. Ischenko and J. Holmes
September 2007, approx. 168 pp., hardcover
ISBN: 978-1-58603-786-4 NEW

Over the past several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working on a definition of ‘nuclear security culture’ so that it can be used as a tool to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. A 2001 IAEA report titled ‘Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities’ identified security culture as one of the twelve principles underlying fissile-material security. In February 2005, at a summit in Bratislava, President Bush and President Putin vowed to step up joint efforts to bolster nuclear security, pairing disciplined, well-trained, responsible custodians and protective forces with well-maintained security systems. In July 2005, a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention was approved elevating the status of security culture to that of a treaty obligation. Since that time, IAEA member states worked on a concept, definition and guidelines for developing and implementing a robust security culture at nuclear facilities worldwide. This NATO workshop presents the views of experts with the hope to contribute to the IAEA’s work and facilitate nuclear security culture worldwide better. Issues include: Universality of nuclear security cultures; Nuclear security in a nation’s culture; Differences and similarities between regions such as US, European Union, Japan, etc.; and The advantages of similarities between the regions.

IOS Press
Nieuwe Hemweg 6B, 1013 BG Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 20 688 3355, Fax: +31 20 687 0039
E-mail: info@iospress.nl

Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism
Volume 29 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics
Edited by: I. Khripunov, L. Bolshov and D. Nikonov
October 2007, approx. 176 pp., hardcover
ISBN: 978-1-58603-787-1 NEW

The threat of radiological terrorism has recently come to the attention of the international community, as it became clear that terrorist organizations are seeking nuclear and radiological material to manufacture and use improvised nuclear devices (IND) and ‘dirty bombs’, and/or commit acts of sabotage against nuclear power infrastructure. But while nuclear weapons and INDs, still remain relatively secure from terrorist access, radiological material is more readily available in large quantities throughout the world. Also, radiological explosives or other dispersal devices are easier to manufacture and to use. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) come in many shapes and sizes; A dirty bomb uses a conventional explosion to scatter radioactive material; Terrorists could launch an attack by placing a container of radioactive material in a public place and an airplane can easily disperse radioactive material as a powder or an aerosol. On a grand scale, a nuclear facility could become an RDD. Intentional damage done to a nuclear power plant or other site could release radiation, contaminating the immediate surroundings or even beyond. RDDs of any kind present a potent and effective terrorist weapon because they threaten to expose civilian populaces to radiation – engendering panic out of proportion to the modest number of casualties likely to result from limited doses of radiation. Coming to terms with the psychological and social dimensions of radiological attacks – areas that are inadequately studied and assessed – is thus a matter of considerable importance for those entrusted with national, and ultimately international, security.
IOS Press
Nieuwe Hemweg 6B, 1013 BG Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 20 688 3355, Fax: +31 20 687 0039
E-mail: info@iospress.nl

U.S. and Russia Cooperation Continues on Nuclear Security

2007-07-10T12:45:00.000-04:00

Newly Signed Fifth Bratislava Report Highlights Most Recent Advances in Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation

WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) Director Sergey Kiriyenko today submitted to Presidents Bush and Putin the fifth report on nuclear security cooperation between the two countries. The report is known as the Bratislava Report after the 2005 historic nonproliferation agreement between the two presidents. It details significant work completed by the United States and Russia over the past six months in the areas of emergency response, nuclear security procedures and best practices, security culture, research reactors, and nuclear site security.

“This latest report clearly shows that our joint efforts with Russia to secure and minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors are making the world safer,” Secretary Bodman said. “We are seeing steady progress on converting the world’s research reactors from using highly enriched uranium to using low enriched uranium that cannot be readily used in a nuclear weapon. In addition, work to improve security at facilities with nuclear material will be completed by 2008.”

The report, which is delivered to each president two times a year, highlights discussions between the two countries on preparing for nuclear emergencies and developing a strong nuclear security culture. It also includes information about upcoming work to convert a research reactor in Vietnam so that the highly enriched uranium can be returned to Russia. It highlights future efforts to return Russian-origin highly enriched uranium from Poland, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Libya, Serbia, and the Czech Republic. The successful return of over 80 kilograms of United States-origin highly enriched uranium from Australia and Japan is noted in the report.

One of the key aspects of the Bratislava agreement two years ago was the adoption of an accelerated schedule for upgrading security at sites with nuclear material in Russia. The report reaffirms each country’s commitment to the accelerated completion schedule and also highlights the recent Rosatom agreement regarding the sustainability of the U.S.-installed security upgrades.

During the 2005 meeting in Bratislava, U.S. President Bush and Russian President Putin committed both governments to securing nuclear weapons and material to prevent the possibility that such weapons or materials could fall into the hands of terrorists. The presidents established a group of senior officials to work together on nuclear security issues who would report the status of cooperation to the presidents. The next report is due in December 2007.

Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Visit the National Nuclear Security Administration homepage for more information.

International Core Group on Nuclear Security Culture

2007-06-26T10:52:00.001-04:00

The International Core Group on Nuclear Security Culture was established as a follow-up to the October 2005 NATO Advanced Research Workshop "Nuclear Security Culture: From National Best Practices to International Standards." The main objectives of the CG are:

Support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by facilitating and promoting the IAEA’s objectives vis-a-vis nuclear security culture
Rally international support for the concept of nuclear security culture by working to achieve a common understanding that facilitates comparison, evaluation, improvement, and international cooperation in the field of nuclear security
Promote a textured concept of nuclear security culture that takes into account varying national traditions, histories, and economic, social, and political realities

Members are being recruited to add geographic balance (e.g., representatives from Japan, Russia, Brazil, and UnitedStates) and multidisciplinary skills (e.g., specialists in industrial psychology and human-resource management). Members will take part in an informal capacity and in keeping with their preferences, limitations, and skills.

Core Group members can choose among several activities at their discretion:

Remain on our mailing list to receive information regarding security culture
Furnish advice and comments regarding security-culture-related activity (including through a web-based forum to be included in the WMD Security Culture website)
Participate in research projects
Review papers and reports
Take part in workshops and conferences on behalf of the Core Group
Provide training at educational and outreach sessions organized by CITS/UGA
Contribute to the CITS/UGA WMD Security Culture website

Before the IAEA finalizes and approves its concept and definition of nuclear security culture and devises plans for implementation, CITS/UGA will work with the Core Group to:

Exchange information and discuss strategies to promote nuclear security awareness in target countries. In recognition of the key role played by the public in nuclear security, we will conduct public lectures, briefings for the media, training for regional leaders, and other outreach activities as the opportunity presents itself. We will conduct such activities in concert with national authorities or local nongovernmental organizations. We will also craft generic model legal basis conducive to high standards of security awareness and culture.
Encourage national legislatures in key countries to approve the July 2005 amendments to the Physical Protection Convention. We will pursue this effort jointly with local nongovernmental organizations and/or private entities. We will hold international workshops and briefings for parliamentarians and their staffs, to be attended by experts from other countries and by IAEA officials. CITS/UGA has compiled an enviable record in this sort of activity, specifically by encouraging national legislatures to enact rigorous export control laws. The contacts and trust we have established to promote export controls will be extremely useful in this endeavor. We will also open new channels of communication through members of the international Core Group. Since security culture is just one of the twelve fundamental principles to be added to the Physical Protection Convention, such events will be instrumental in educating legislators and major stakeholders.

After the IAEA releases its approved package of security-culture documents and guidelines, CITS/UGA, in cooperation with the Core Group, will:

Contribute analysis and articles to a wide range of publications and the CITS WMD Security Culture website, and organize panels on nuclear security culture at relevant national and international conferences. We will use scholarly and applied research to raise the profile of security culture and promote a common understanding of the concept. One immediate objective is to assemble a panel for the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management, scheduled for July 2006 in Nashville, Tennessee. We will report among other things on the findings of our Moscow workshop and on our follow-up activities. Since CITS/UGA is a sustaining member of the INMM and most Core Group members are regular members-the INMM, which co-sponsored the Moscow workshop, awarded free 2006 memberships to all workshop attendees-we intend to organize Core Group activities to coincide with those of the INMM and to coordinate our agendas.

Develop a modular training course consistent with IAEA guidelines that can be tailored to the specific needs and conditions of different regions. The ultimate objective is to develop a cadre of security-culture faculty available to participate in outreach and training projects. Of particular importance will be introducing security culture in countries that are about to embark on the development of nuclear power infrastructure. Nuclear personnel must undergo security-culture training, even before construction of this infrastructure begins.

Develop and test different evaluation methodologies, preferably by conducting pilot projects in selected countries. One project we hope to undertake would focus on the former Soviet republics, which share important similarities resulting from their mutual communist past, common traditions of professional and organizational culture, and other bureaucratic, political, and social characteristics.

Extend the basics of nuclear security culture to radiation sources and to non-nuclear areas such as chemical and biological research and production facilities. The latter effort will require extensive networking with experts in the chemical and biotechnology fields, along with outreach and focused research. We could compile briefing papers examining whether the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Health Organization (WHO) should manage this initiative within their fields of expertise, acting as counterparts to the IAEA. Some Core Group members from the EU countries have recognized the value of applying the principles underlying nuclear security culture to other sensitive areas and have urged us to consider doing this. We agree. We can develop a concept and help decision-makers at the IAEA, the OPCW, and the WHO discern the practical steps necessary to form a security-culture alliance.

Books and reports

2007-06-26T10:30:00.001-04:00

Nuclear Security Culture: the Case of Russia

released November 2004
PDF file: Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader

The Center for International Trade and Security and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) have published a landmark, peer-reviewed report designed to help governments prevent terrorists from obtaining the building blocks for nuclear weapons. Building on the preliminary study completed in 2002, the report points out that efforts to tighten up security at Russian nuclear installations have furnished Russia with adequate security equipment while by-and-large underestimating the importance of the human element of security. Without a skilled, motivated nuclear workforce, the best alarms and fences in the world will not keep fissile materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states. Indeed, faced with financial and other incentives, insiders might be tempted to remove materials entrusted to them, with dire consequences for homeland and international security.

The key insight conveyed in Nuclear Security Culture is that material fixes, while important, cannot be the ultimate solution to security problems. Leaky security is in great part a cultural problem. For example, foreign observers to Russian nuclear installations have reported seeing guards ignore security clearance procedures, cut the electricity to security hardware to save on power bills, and even deactivate annoying alarms. This deficient corporate culture, dubbed "security culture" by the authors, has allowed theft and diversion of dangerous substances to occur with troubling frequency. The report develops a model of corporate culture and recommends how leaders can apply this model to improve security at sensitive facilities. A draft training curriculum connects the everyday routine of nuclear workers with the higher purposes of national and international security, motivating them to perform their duties zealously.

While Russia is used as a case study, problems with security culture are by no means unique to Russia . Even the United States , as Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and "security czar" for the Department of Energy, points out in the preface to Nuclear Security Culture , is not immune to shortcomings in this area. The report aspires to provide standards that apply universally. Security culture is another element in the civilized world's defense-in-depth against nuclear terrorism.

The Human Factor and Security Culture: Challenges to Safeguarding Fissile Materials in Russia
released November 2002
PDF file: Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader

Because it is extremely difficult to produce fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium – the key ingredients for nuclear weapons – terrorists and rogue states will likely attempt to acquire stolen materials. The greatest potential source of stolen fissile materials is Russia, where hundreds of tons of nuclear materials are at risk of theft. Over the last decade, there have been numerous thefts and attempted thefts of these materials from Russian nuclear facilities. Moreover, there is evidence that the al Qaeda and countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria have all attempted to obtain stolen fissile materials from Russia.

The United States has responded to these risks by funding several programs to help Russia improve its control over nuclear materials. The U.S. government has spent over $1.5 billion on these programs since their inception. For both political and technical reasons, however, the bulk of U.S. efforts have been focused more on the technical side of this problem?installing or enhancing equipment for physical protection and material accounting at Russian nuclear facilities.

While these technical upgrades are critically important, their efficient use depends on the extent to which nuclear site personnel are not only trained in technical skills, but also motivated and willing to perform these functions. There is growing evidence that Russian security culture is inconsistent with the nature and magnitude of modern threats, with personnel often failing to recognize the importance of following all the procedures and using the technologies necessary for protecting nuclear materials. Unless this issue is directly and comprehensively addressed, the Western security upgrades to Russian facilities will not be as efficient as originally thought.

Security Culture in Germany
W.-D. Gutschmidt, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Germany

The standing of the terms „security“ and „culture“ is discussed. A brief overview about states and operators responsibilities linked to security culture is given, and a definition of the term “security culture” is explained. The security culture in German nuclear facilities is briefly discussed.

Security Culture in the Nuclear Field
Jean Jalouneix, Denis Winter (IRSN)

By document referenced GOV/2001/41 of the 15th of August 2001, the Board of Governors of the IAEA ratified twelve fundamental principles of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. These principles will be integrated in the future revision of the International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The fundamental principle F proposes a definition of security culture and recommends that its implementation and its maintenance are a priority in the concerned organizations. It thus appears necessary to specify the concept of security culture.

Training Of Guard Forces For The Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities
Axel Hagemann, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Cologne, Germany

The regulatory framework for physical protection in Germany requires a guard service capable of fulfilling its tasks and defines in detail the requirements on equipment, qualification, training and practice of the guard forces. There is also a clear requirement for exercises and practice in the context of required measures in order to support the deployment of the Police forces and cooperation with external authorities. Practice is an essential part of training and continuing professional development of guards. The benefits of conducting exercises are twofold: the results can be used as a basis for an evaluation and it can provide a tool for training. The training required in the regulations and in the license documents is subject to the supervision performed by the federal supervisory authorities. The required training is based on the design of the facility’s physical protection system based on the DBT which provides also the parameters for the exercises in physical protection matters. This presentation gives an overview about the training of the guard service in nuclear facilities and about the efforts to integrate physical protection practices into the emergency exercises in the safety field, which practices emergency situations beyond the design. The design of physical protection systems based on the Design Basis Threat (DBT) provides sound basic protection, which is supported by the actual training. The terrifying events of September 11th have shown that even though the DBT-based system design provides a strong protection against a wide range of credible threats, it is advisable to be better prepared also for the situation when the physical protection system fails or does not cover all the real circumstances and the real threat which could lead to an emergency situation.

Selected bibliography

2007-06-26T10:03:00.001-04:00

Concept and definition

2007-06-26T09:52:00.000-04:00

The concept of nuclear security culture continues to be the subject of debate and clarification, despite IAEA's efforts to arrive at a mutually acceptable definition and concept. Most experts agree that nuclear security culture is part of the overall organizational and professional culture in the industry or at specific facilities, which, in turn, is a function of the overall culture, tradition, and historical background in a country

One of the most recognized authorities on organizational culture is Edgar Schein's seminal work Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3d ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004). Schein's definition of organizational culture is considered to be one of the most comprehensive, and it reads that a culture is

“a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

IAEA's efforts to work out a definition of nuclear security culture originates in many ways from similar work done in 1980s and 1990s on nuclear safety culture. IAEA's International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group report defines nuclear safety culture as the

"assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals that, as an overriding priority, nuclear power plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance."

One of the more recent concepts and definitions of nucelar security culture came from CITS/UGA report "Nuclear Security Culture: the Case of Russia," stating that the concept can be characterized by

the degree to which all personnel, from senior managers and supervisors down to the most junior operators, are aware of and committed to widely understood security requirements and best practices
the degree to which available and affordable security technology is put to use, kept in good working condition, and improved
the degree to which security regulations and procedures are implemented and personnel are motivated to accomplish their security-related tasks

However, many experts believe that there are both overlaps and inherent contradictions in the goals, objectives and elements of safety and security cultures, which warrant different approaches, or even do not allow for separation of the two concepts.

Regardless of the various opinions, it is clear that the sooner the international community has a working operational definition of nuclear security culture, the more effective will be the efforts to secure and protect nuclear and radioactive materials and sources.

About this project

2007-06-26T09:32:00.000-04:00

Over the past several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working on a definition of “nuclear security culture” so that it can be used as a tool to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

Indeed, a 2001 IAEA report titled “Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities” identified security culture as one of the twelve principles underlying fissile-material security.

In February 2005, at their summit in Bratislava, President Bush and President Putin vowed to step up joint efforts to bolster security culture, pairing disciplined, well-trained, responsible custodians and protective forces with well-maintained security systems.

In July 2005, a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention was approved elevating the status of security culture to that of a treaty obligation. In October 2005, a NATO Advanced Research Workshop held in Moscow, Russia gathered over 90 international experts, attempting to build a consensus on the concept and definition of nuclear security culture by sharing national best practices in the management of fissile materials.

This website is designed to serve both as a resource and a forum for nuclear managers, policy-makers and researchers worldwide with the idea of contunuing the dialogue and discussion on nuclear security culture. Our main objective is to support and augment the ongoing IAEA activity by identifying existing trends, perceptions and approaches.